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     This study examines the associations of controlling shareholders and audit committee 
effectiveness with earnings quality.  A sample of non-financial Thai listed firms is used 
in the study because Thailand provides a useful setting for the study of ownership 
concentration.  A unique data set on the voting rights of controlling shareholders and 
audit committee characteristics is used to test the hypotheses of whether controlling 
shareholders and audit committees with strong governance characteristics affect the 
quality of earnings.  Earnings quality is measured using (1) Basu’s (1997) asymmetric 
timeliness measure of accounting conservatism, and (2) absolute abnormal accruals 
estimated from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) and the Jones (1991) models and its 
variations.  Audit committee effectiveness is measured using a composite index 
comprising four audit committee characteristics. 
 
     The empirical results show that firms with a controlling shareholder, on average, are 
associated with both lower accounting conservatism (lower earnings quality) and lower 
absolute abnormal accruals (higher earnings quality) than firms with no controlling 
shareholder.  Further analysis shows that family- and the government-controlled firms 
and firms whose controlling shareholders have voting rights below 75%, in particular, are 
associated with lower accounting conservatism and absolute abnormal accruals.  
Although the results imply both lower and higher earnings quality for firms with a 
controlling shareholder compared to firms with no controlling shareholder, the lower 
(higher) absolute abnormal accruals (earnings quality) simply reflects less conservative 
accounting practice by firms with a controlling shareholder.  The results provide no 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
     Ownership structure and the audit committee have been described as fundamental 
elements of corporate governance in prior literature.  In this study, I focus on the 
influence of ownership structure and the audit committee on earnings quality.  Central to 
the analysis of corporate governance is the concept of separation of ownership and 
control, in which owners of the firm are not in charged with using and controlling the 
firm’s resources.   Prior research on corporate governance, especially in the U.S. and the 
U.K., has focused on conflict of interests arisen from such separation of ownership and 
control between owners (principals) and managers (agents) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In many other economies, however, ownership is concentrated in the hands of one or a 
few owners who are also often active in management (La Porta et al., 1999).  
Concentrated ownership is common even in some developed economies such as in 
continental Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002).  In economies with concentrated ownership, 
instead of traditional principal-agent conflicts, conflict of interests between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders has been identified as a major concern of 
corporate governance.  The prevalence of controlling shareholders with concentrated 
ownership and voting rights in Thailand (Claessens et al., 2000; Wiwattanakantang, 
2001) provides a useful setting to study the relation between this type of agency conflicts 
and earnings quality.   
     This study is related to that of Fan and Wong (2002) which documents the relation 
between ownership concentration in East Asia and earnings quality.  However, while Fan 
and Wong (2002) examine earnings informativeness, this study focuses on accounting 
conservatism and abnormal accruals as will be discussed in more detail below.  Further, 
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Fan and Wong (2002) examine ownership for the period prior to the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, whereas this study focuses on the period after the crisis. Several requirements on 
corporate governance introduced after such financial crisis might have influence on the 
dynamics between ownership structure and earnings quality. 
     The audit committee has been regarded as integral to quality financial reporting.  In 
response to financial crises over the last decade, corporate governance reforms in many 
countries have empowered the role of the audit committee in the oversight of financial 
reporting (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; Smith, 2003).  In Thailand, following the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, the Stock Exchange of Thailand requires that all listed 
companies have an audit committee.  Such requirement, however, was based on best 
practice guidelines from developed economies where ownership is dispersed.  As such, 
the study of the association between the audit committee and earnings quality in Thailand 
provides an interesting insight into whether the role of the audit committee, an important 
governance mechanism, is different in a developing economy with different institutional 
environment from that of developed countries such as the U. S.. 
     Prior studies have found that ownership structure can affect earnings quality.  For 
example, Francis et al. (2005b), in the U.S. context, show that earnings are generally less 
informative for firms with dual-class ownership structure than for firms with single-class 
ownership structure.  Fan and Wong (2002), in East Asian context, find that ownership 
concentration is associated with low earnings informativeness.  Prior research has also 
examined the relation between the audit committee and earnings quality.  Most studies 
examine certain audit committee characteristics, such as independence (Klein, 2002), size 
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(Anderson et al., 2004) and financial expertise (Bédard et al., 2004), whether these 
characteristics are associated with higher or lower earnings quality.    
     For this study, I consider three competing arguments based on prior research that may 
explain the relation between controlling shareholders and earnings quality.  The first 
argument is related to the entrenchment effect of concentrated ownership (Morck et al., 
1988).  As controlling shareholders become entrenched due to their concentrated voting 
power, they have incentives to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (Morck et 
al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and conceal their private benefits by reporting low 
quality earnings.  The second argument concerns the incentive alignment effect of 
ownership concentration (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Because of their high ownership 
stakes in the firm, controlling shareholders have interests that are more aligned with those 
of minority shareholders, and thus are motivated to report high quality earnings.  The 
third argument is related to the demand for earnings quality by users of financial 
statements (Ball et al., 2003).  Controlling shareholders have no incentive to report high 
quality earnings because information asymmetry can be resolved through insider 
networks often prevalent in concentrated ownership environment.  On the flip side, 
however, due to poor outside investor protection often the case in countries with 
concentrated ownership, outside investors may be motivated to demand high quality 
earnings reporting from the controlling shareholder before financing the firm. 
     The analysis in this study is based on an original data set on voting rights of 
controlling shareholders and audit committee characteristics of Thai listed firms collected 
for 2005.  Following La Porta et al. (1999), the voting rights is computed using ultimate, 
rather than, immediate ownership of the firm.  In this study, a controlling shareholder is a 
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shareholder whose combined direct and indirect voting rights in the firm exceed 25%.  To 
test the hypothesis on the relation between the audit committee and earnings quality, a 
composite measure of audit committee effectiveness is constructed based on four audit 
committee characteristics. These characteristics include audit committee size, the ratio of 
audit committee members with accounting financial expertise, average tenure of audit 
committee members, and average number of outside audit committee positions held by 
audit committee members.  Prior studies have shown that a larger audit committee or an 
audit committee containing more members with financial expertise, longer tenure, or 
more outside directorship plays a stronger governance role. 
     Earnings quality used in this study is based on measures of accounting conservatism 
and accruals-based earnings quality, specifically the absolute value of abnormal accruals.  
The Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure is used to proxy for accounting 
conservatism.  Following prior studies, five models are used to determine abnormal 
accruals: (1) the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, (2)the Jones (1991) model, (3) the 
Jones (1991) model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995) [modified-Jones (1991) model], 
(4) the Jones (1991) model adjusted for performance, and (5) the modified-Jones (1991) 
model adjusted for performance. 
     OLS regressions are performed to test several hypotheses on the relation between 
controlling shareholders and earnings quality set forth in the study.  The full sample uses 
voting rights and audit committee data from 2005 and financial and stock data from 2005 
to 2007.  To alleviate endogeneity concern, OLS regressions are also run for a subsample 
using financial and stock data from 2006 to 2007 only.  
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     I find a significant negative relation between firms with a controlling shareholder and 
accounting conservatism measure.  Further analysis shows that such negative relation is 
largely driven by family and the government controlling shareholders.  I also find 
negative relation between controlling shareholders with voting rights below 75% and the 
measure of accounting conservatism.  I, however, do not find significant relation between 
an audit committee with strong governance characteristics and accounting conservatism.  
These results suggest that firms with a controlling shareholder on average are associated 
with lower earnings quality as measured by the level of accounting conservatism than 
firms with no controlling shareholder.  The results also do not provide evidence that an 
effective audit committee play a significant role in improving earnings quality. 
     For the relation between controlling shareholders and accruals-based earnings quality, 
I find a negative significant relation between firms with a controlling shareholder and 
absolute abnormal accruals.  The results are particularly strong for firms with family or 
the government as controlling shareholders and for firms in which voting rights of 
controlling shareholders are below 75%.  An examination of signed abnormal accruals 
suggests that this negative relation is largely driven by negative or income-decreasing 
abnormal accruals.  Firms with family controlling shareholders, in particular, are found to 
be less involved in income-decreasing activities.  These results suggest firms with a 
controlling shareholder on average are associated with higher earnings quality in terms of 
magnitude of abnormal accruals than firms with no controlling shareholder. 
     With respect to the relation between audit committee effectiveness and accruals-based 
earnings quality, I do not find significant relation between audit committees with strong 
governance characteristics and absolute abnormal accruals.  An examination of signed 
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abnormal accruals, however, shows some weak evidence that audit committees with 
strong governance quality are associated with higher income-increasing and -decreasing 
abnormal accruals.  Taken as a whole, these results do not provide evidence that high 
quality audit committees a significant role in moderating earnings management, 
inconsistent with some prior research and recommendations by standard setters. 
     Overall, the results provide evidence that firms with a controlling shareholder report 
less conservative earnings than firms with no controlling shareholders. This could be the 
results of entrenchment or low demand for accounting conservatism.  The results also 
seem to suggest that firms with a controlling shareholder report lower magnitude of 
abnormal accruals, in other words, higher accruals-based earnings quality than firms with 
no controlling shareholder.  The results for low absolute abnormal accruals should be 
interpreted with caution, however, as they may not necessarily represent lower earnings 
management using accruals.  Considering together, the results from accounting 
conservatism and abnormal accruals analyses suggest that the low absolute abnormal 
accruals simply reflect the less timeliness in loss recognition by firms with a controlling 
shareholder.  In particular, the findings that the low absolute abnormal accruals are 
largely driven by the low negative or income-decreasing abnormal accruals strongly 
support the influence of less conservative accounting on the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals for firms with a controlling shareholder.  As noted in Haw et al. (2004), the 
potential effect of less timely loss recognition on accruals may cast doubt on the use of 
absolute abnormal accruals alone as a measure of earnings management in some studies.  
A positive relation between absolute abnormal accruals and the variable of interest may 
not always be due to less earnings management.   
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     This study contributes to the research on earnings quality and ownership structure, in 
particular concentrated ownership.  More narrowly, the study also adds to the literature 
on family firms and earnings quality (Ali et al., 2007; Wang, 2006).  Regarding research 
on accounting conservatism, this study provides evidence on whether accounting 
conservatism has potential use as a monitoring mechanism in the presence of agency 
conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders rather than between 
owners and management.  As argued in Watts (2003a; 2003b), the asymmetric timeliness 
in recognizing losses relative to gains can be used to reduce managerial bias in earnings 
number.  Further, this study contributes to the research on audit committee effectiveness, 
whether, in ownership concentrated environment, outside investors can benefit from high 
quality audit committees in improving earnings quality.   
     The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents 
literature review and hypotheses development.  Chapter 3 describes the measurement of 
variables, regression models employed to test the hypotheses, definition of variables, data 
and sample selection.  Chapter 4 reports the descriptive statistics and the results of the 
empirical tests.  Chapter 5 presents additional analyses, and Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
     In this chapter, I review prior literature relevant to the study and develop hypotheses 
to be tested.  For earnings quality, I focus on two categories: conservatism and accruals-
based earnings quality.  These two categories have been widely used in accounting 
research (see, e.g., Francis et al., 2006). 
2.1. Concentrated ownership in Thailand and East Asia 
     High ownership concentration is characteristic of most East Asian firms, including 
Thailand (Claessens et al., 2000).  Claessens et al. (2000) finds that a significant 
proportion of shares are usually concentrated in the hands of one or a few shareholders, 
mostly families followed by the state.  Of these family-controlled firms, about 60% have 
top management that is related to the controlling family.  Firms are often affiliated with 
business groups, consisting of various public and private firms controlled by the same 
controlling shareholder (Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens and Fan, 2002).  Claessens et 
al. (2000) also show that controlling shareholders often leverage their voting rights over 
their ownership stake (cash flow rights) through mechanisms such as dual-class share 
structure, pyramidal ownership structure, and cross-holdings.  However, these 
mechanisms are the least common in Thailand.  In particular, less than 13% and 1% of 
their sample of Thai firms employ pyramid and cross-holdings structure, respectively 
(Claessens et al., 2000).   
     Such concentrated ownership frequently results in agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, unlike conflicts between owners and 
managers in developed economies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). By having substantial 
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control in the firm, controlling shareholders have the power to act in their own interests 
that may lead to the expropriation, or the transfer of the value, from the minority 
shareholders to controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Expropriation can 
take many forms such as stealing the profits outright from the firm, transfer pricing, 
putting unqualified family members in management positions, excessive compensation, 
or diversion of investment opportunities from the firm (Johnson et al., 1998; La Porta et 
al., 2000).  Johnson et al. (2000) and Mitton (2002) suggest that the expropriation of 
minority shareholders exists during the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. 
     Prior research suggests that ownership concentration could be the result of, or 
substitute for, weak legal systems that do not provide sufficient protection of the rights of 
outside investors (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
For example, some family controlling shareholders may want to maintain concentrated 
ownership of the firm because the family’s reputation could help attract external 
financing when investor protection is poor (La Porta et al., 2000).  Some other firms may 
have to remain family-controlled because of the difficulty in attracting outside funds 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Controlling shareholders can also use high ownership 
stakes as a credible signal that they commit to act in the interests of the firm and the 
minority shareholders (Gomes, 2000).  Consistent with this, La Porta et al. (2002) find 
that firm value is higher in countries with better investor protection and in firms with 
higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder. 
2.2. The role of accounting conservatism 
     Conservatism is a fundamental concept in financial accounting.  Basu (1997) 
describes accounting conservatism as requiring more thorough verification in recognizing 
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good news as gains than bad news as losses.  Thus, under accounting conservatism, 
losses are incorporated into accounting earnings in a more timely manner.  Watts (2003a) 
argues that accounting conservatism is an efficient financial reporting mechanism that 
benefits users of the firm’s financial statements.  The requirement for asymmetric timely 
loss recognition can be used as a monitoring mechanism to constrain management’s 
opportunistic behavior in reporting accounting measures used in a contract (Watts, 2003a; 
2003b). 
2.3 The entrenchment effect and earnings quality 
     With effective control of the firm, the controlling shareholder can become entrenched 
and expropriate from minority interests in the forms described above.  The entrenchment 
problem can be exacerbated if the controlling shareholder employs such mechanisms as 
pyramid or cross-holding structure to increase his/er voting rights above cash flow rights.  
With high voting power to control the firm’s activities, the controlling shareholder can 
also influence the firm’s financial reporting and accounting choices.  Fan and Wong 
(2002) find that the informativeness of accounting earnings is lower for East Asian firms 
whose controlling shareholders have higher voting rights and higher divergence between 
voting rights and cash flow rights. 
     Leuz et al. (2003) argue that conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and 
outside investors creates incentives for controlling shareholders to mask true firm 
performance through earnings management in order to conceal private control benefits.  
Also, Leuz et al. (2003) show that earnings management is more pervasive in countries 
where outside investor protection is weak.  Haw et al. (2004) find an association between 
earnings management and the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights of 
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controlling shareholders, while provide evidence that strong legal systems and 
infrastructure, not directly focus on outsider protection, mitigate such earnings 
management.  
     Based on the entrenchment effect, I expect controlling shareholders to prefer low 
earning quality to conceal their private control benefits and evidence of expropriation of 
minority shareholders.   In particular I expect controlling shareholders to prefer less 
accounting conservatism as it provides timely information on losses, and prefer low 
accruals-based earnings quality to mask true performance. 
2.4 The incentive alignment effect and earnings quality 
     Increased cash flow ownership in the firm by controlling shareholders can reduce 
incentives for expropriation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Controlling shareholders gain 
both more voting rights and cash-flow rights in the firm from increased ownership stake.  
Once controlling shareholders have acquired sufficient voting rights to gain effective 
control of the firm, more voting rights does not further entrench the controlling 
shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002).  Higher cash-flow rights, however, mean that it will 
cost the controlling shareholders more to expropriate from minority or outside investors 
(Fan and Wong, 2002).  Claessens et al. (2002) find that firm value increases with higher 
cash-flow rights of the largest controlling shareholders. 
     For controlling shareholders with high ownership stake, the incentive alignment effect 
could influence them to choose accounting practices that align with the interest of the 
minority shareholders, that is, reporting high quality of earnings. 
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2.5 The demand for earnings quality 
     Ball et al. (2003) argue that financial reporting quality is determined by market 
demands specific to each country.  They examine accounting conservatism during 1984-
1996 in four East Asian countries—Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.  Ball 
et al. (2003) find no significant asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition in their sample.  
They argue that the lack of demand for accounting conservatism in these four countries is 
due to the prevalence of family controlled firms and insider networks, and as such 
information asymmetry is resolved through insider communication rather than through 
financial reporting and public disclosure.  
     Khanna and Rivkin (2001) support the argument by Ball et al. (2003) on the 
prominent role played by business groups in some countries including Thailand.  Khanna 
and Rivkin (2001) indicate that firms within groups or networks typically may raise 
capital jointly, exchange resources internally, exchange information at group meetings, 
and buy and sell goods among themselves.  This practice reduces the reliance on public 
disclosure, and thus the demand for earnings and financial reporting quality. 
     Along the same line, Chen et al. (2008) find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family 
firms provide less voluntary disclosure.  Chen et al. (2008) argue that family owners are 
usually involved in firm management, and hence can better monitor management and 
have less information asymmetry between owners and management.  Such direct 
monitoring is substituted for corporate disclosure in mitigating agency problems (Chen et 
al., 2008). 
     The above discussion suggests that the affiliation with business groups of firms with a 
controlling shareholder, and hence less diverse shareholder base, could lead to a low 
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demand for quality public disclosure from those firms because information asymmetry 
can be resolved through insider network. 
     On the flip side, however, due to poor outside investor protection often the case in 
countries with concentrated ownership, outside investors may be motivated to demand 
high quality earnings reporting from the controlling shareholder to protect their interests 
in the firm (Wang, 2006). 
      The formal hypotheses are specified in the next section. 
2.6 Hypotheses to test the relation between controlling shareholders and earnings 
quality 
     Based on the discussion in the previous section on the entrenchment effect, the 
incentive alignment effect, and the demand for earnings quality, I test the following 
hypothesis, stated in null form: 
H1:  There is no difference in the association with earnings quality between firms with a 
controlling shareholder and firms with no controlling shareholder. 
     To gain further insight, I also test the following four hypotheses, stated in null form, 
for different types of controlling shareholders: 
H2a: There is no difference in the association with earnings quality between firms with a 
family controlling shareholder and firms with no controlling shareholder. 
H2b:  There is no difference in the association with earnings quality between firms with a 
widely held corporation or financial institution as a controlling shareholder and 
firms with no controlling shareholder. 
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H2c: There is no difference in the association with earnings quality between firms with 
the government as a controlling shareholder and firms with no controlling 
shareholder. 
H2d: There is no difference in the association with earnings quality between firms with a 
foreign controlling shareholder and firms with no controlling shareholder. 
     Motivated by Morck et al. (1988) who suggest that managers with different levels of 
ownership may have different incentives, I also test the hypotheses for different levels of 
voting rights of controlling shareholders.  Similar to Wiwattanakantang (2001), the 
different levels of voting rights used are voting rights between 25%-50%, 50%-75%, and 
at least 75%.  The choice for each level is not completely arbitrary.  As will be discussed 
later, 25% of voting rights would allow a shareholder sufficient control of the firm.  
Voting rights of more than 50% make up the majority.  Voting rights of at least 75% give 
a shareholder a supermajority for certain critical decisions in the firm, according to the 
Thai public company law.  In particular, I test the following hypotheses, stated in null 
form: 
H3a: There is no difference in the association with earnings quality between firms whose 
controlling shareholder has voting rights between 25%-50% and firms with no 
controlling shareholder.  
H3b: There is no difference in the association with earnings quality between firms whose 
controlling shareholder has voting rights between 50%-75% and firms with no 
controlling shareholder. 
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H3c: There is no difference in the association with earnings quality between firms whose 
controlling shareholder has voting rights at least 75% and firms with no controlling 
shareholder. 
2.6 Audit committee effectiveness and earnings quality 
     The corporate governance role of the audit committee has been strengthened 
throughout the past decades (see, e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; Cadbury 
Committee, 1992; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; Treadway Commission, 1987).  In 
Thailand, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) required that effective from 1999 all 
listed companies have an audit committee.  Prior research suggests that one of the key 
roles of the audit committee is the oversight of the integrity of financial statements and 
reporting process (DeZoort et al., 2002).  This role is essentially the main reason for the 
audit committee’s existence (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005).  Other responsibilities of 
the audit committee include the oversight of internal controls and external auditor’s 
activities (DeZoort et al., 2002).   
     Several characteristics of an effective audit committee have been examined in prior 
literature.  In this study, I focus on four characteristics of the audit committee: size, 
tenure, number outside audit committee positions held, and financial expertise.1
Audit committee size 
  I review 
the literature relevant to each of the characteristics next. 
     An audit committee requires significant resources, including the adequate number of 
directors, to meet its responsibilities and expectations.  Larger audit committees can 
                                                 
1 Audit committee independence is not included because the SET requires that each audit committee 
member of listed companies be independent.  In general, the SET independence requirements are in line 
with the requirements under the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
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provide an increased diversity of experience (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005).  Also, an 
audit committee with more members, on average, has more resources and time to oversee 
financial reporting process than an audit committee with fewer members (Anderson et al., 
2004).   
     Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) and Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) report that larger 
audit committees provide more support for the external auditor.  Specifically, 
Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) find that firms that made suspicious auditor switches 
had smaller audit committees than nonsuspicious switching firms.  Vafeas and Waegelein 
(2007) note that larger audit committees are associated with higher audit fees.  Chen and 
Zhou (2007) suggest that firms with larger audit committee demand an external auditor 
with better reputation.  In particular, Chen and Zhou (2007) find that firms with larger 
audit committee dismiss Arthur Andersen sooner after the Andersen-Enron situation, and 
are more likely to choose a Big 4 successor auditor. 
     Anderson et al. (2004) argue that creditors have high concerns about the integrity of a 
company’s financial reports because they rely on accounting-based numbers in lending 
agreements.  Anderson et al. (2004) find that larger audit committees are associated with 
a lower cost of debt financing, suggesting that larger audit committees provide better 
monitoring of financial reporting process than their smaller counterparts.      
Audit committee tenure 
     Prior studies suggest that a longer tenure on the board provides a director with more 
important knowledge about the firm and its operating environment, and thus allows the 
director to become more confident and effective in his/er roles and responsibilities 
(Koznik, 1990; Singh and Harianto, 1989).  New board members, on the other hand, 
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require time to become familiar with firm-specific operations before they could make 
meaningful contributions (Singh and Harianto, 1989). 
     The SET does not mandate the number of years a person can serve on the firm’s audit 
committee.  In its Best Practice Guidelines for Audit Committee (SET, 1999), the SET 
recommends a period of 2-5 years for each term of an audit committee member, but the 
term can be renewed upon the approval of the Board of Directors or shareholders’ 
meeting.   
     Consistent with previous research, Beasley (1996) finds that as the average tenure of 
outside directors on the board increases, the likelihood of financial statement fraud 
decreases.  Yang and Krishnan (2005), finds that the average tenure of audit committee 
members is negatively related to quarterly earnings management. 
Number of outside audit committee positions held 
     Several studies have examined multiple directorships held by a director in other firms.  
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors are controlled by 
the market for corporate directors, which can reward them with additional directorships 
or punish them based on their performance.  Directors have incentives to provide good 
monitoring of the firm to signal to the market that they are competent (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  Multiple other directorships held by an audit committee member, thus, suggest 
that such audit committee member has successfully developed reputation in the market as 
an oversight expert (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Bédard et al. (2004) also suggest that 
holding more board positions allows an audit committee to gain experience and keep 
abreast of governance best practices. 
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     Consistent with the above arguments, Srinivasan (2005) finds that audit committee 
members of firms that overstated earnings were likely to lose more directorship positions 
held in other firms than did their non-audit committee counterparts.  Moreover, the higher 
the severity of earnings overstatement, the greater the likelihood that audit committee 
members departed the firm’s board and lost more other directorships (Srinivasan, 2005).  
Similarly, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) finds that outside directors experience a significant 
decline in the number of directorships held in other firms following a financial fraud 
lawsuit.  The more severe the allegations of fraud and the greater the responsibilities of 
the outside directors for monitoring fraud, the greater is the decline in other board seats 
held (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). 
     Further, Bédard et al. (2004) find that the average number of other directorships held 
by independent audit committee members is negatively associated with aggressive 
earnings management.  Carcello and Neal (2003) find that firms whose audit committees 
have higher average number of other directorships held by independent audit committee 
members are less likely to dismiss their external auditors following going-concern 
opinions.   
Audit committee financial expertise 
     Because the key responsibility of the audit committee is to oversee the financial 
reporting process and controls, financial expertise is essential to the audit committee’s 
effectiveness (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005; Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999).  Lack of 
knowledge or understanding of complex technical financial problems may lead to 
ineffective judgments and performance of the audit committee (DeZoort, 1998; Kalbers 
and Fogarty, 1993). 
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     Numerous studies have examined the relation between financial expertise of the audit 
committee and the quality of financial reporting.  Bédard et al. (2004) find that financial 
expertise of the audit committee is negatively associated with aggressive earnings 
management.  Abbott et al. (2004) find that an audit committee containing at least one 
member with financial expertise is negatively associated with occurrence of restatement 
of financial reports.  Farber (2005) shows that firms identified by the SEC as fraudulently 
manipulating financial statements have fewer financial experts on the audit committee 
compared to non-fraud firms.  McDaniel et al. (2002), in an experimental study, suggest 
that including members with financial expertise on audit committees is likely to bring 
structure and consistency to the committee’s discussions and evaluations of overall 
financial reporting quality.  Financial expert members are also likely to help to direct the 
focus of the audit committee towards issues critical to the quality of financial reporting 
(McDaniel et al., 2002).   
     On internal controls, Krishnan (2005), studied the period before the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, indicates that audit committees with more financial expertise are 
significantly less likely to be associated with the incidence of internal control problems.  
Along the same line, Zhang et al. (2007) find that, post Sarbanes-Oxley period, audit 
committees with more financial expertise are less likely to be associated with internal 
control weaknesses.  DeZoort and Salterio (2001) noted that audit committee members 
with higher audit knowledge were more likely to support an external auditor in the 
dispute with management over an accounting policy choice. 
    Using a composite variable as a measure of audit committee effectiveness, Abbott et 
al. (2007) define an effective audit committee as a committee that is comprised entirely 
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of independent directors, includes at least one member with financial expertise, and meets 
at least four times annually.  They find that firms with an effective audit committee were 
less likely to outsource routine internal audit activities to their current external auditor.  
Abbott et al. (2007) argue that outsourcing routine internal audit activities to companies’ 
current external auditor could impair internal auditor independence.  Lastly, DeFond et 
al. (2005) find that only accounting-related financial expertise, not broader-defined 
financial expertise (e.g., expertise gain from experience as a CEO), is likely to improve 
the quality of the audit committee.   
2.8 Hypothesis to test the relation between audit committee effectiveness and 
earnings quality 
     Overall, prior research suggests that an effective audit committee with strong 
governance characteristics plays an important role in ensuring the integrity of the firm’s 
financial statements and internal controls.  Thus, based on previous research, it should be 
expected that an effective audit committee with governance characteristics would 
promote accounting conservatism within the firm and moderate the use of accruals to 
manipulate earnings.  However, most previous research discussed above is based on 
samples of firms in the U.S. with largely dispersed ownership structures and relatively 
well established audit committees as an important element of corporate governance 
mechanisms.  It is unclear a priori how an audit committee would function as a corporate 
governance mechanism in concentrated ownership environments.  Therefore, I state my 
hypothesis as follows: 
H4:  There is no difference in the association with earnings quality between an audit 
committee with stronger and weaker governance characteristics. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
     This Chapter discusses the research method used to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 2.  First, it describes the measurement of proxies for earnings quality, controlling 
shareholders, and audit committee effectiveness.  It then explains the regression models 
and definition of variables employed to test the hypotheses.  Finally, it details the data 
and sample selection process. 
3.1 Measures of earnings quality 
     This section describes earnings quality measures used in the study.  As mentioned 
earlier, I focus on two categories of earnings quality: conservatism and accruals-based 
earnings quality.  These two categories have been widely used in prior accounting 
research. 
3.1.1 Measure of accounting conservatism 
     Following Basu (1997), I define accounting conservatism as the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings in recognizing good news and bad news.  In particular, I measure 
accounting conservatism using the following reverse regression: 
εββββ ++++= NRDRRNRDNI *3210                                                                       (1) 
where NI is net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the beginning 
of the fiscal year; R is the buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year; NRD equals 1 if R is 
negative, 0 otherwise.  The coefficient β2 captures the timeliness of earnings in reflecting 
positive returns (a proxy for good news).  The coefficient β3 captures the incremental 
timeliness of earnings in incorporating negative returns (a proxy for bad news).  As in 
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many previous studies on conservatism, I use the coefficient β3 to measure the degree of 
accounting conservatism in this study. 
3.1.2 Measures of accruals-based earnings quality 
     Various accruals-based measures have been used in prior literature to proxy for 
earnings quality.  In this study, I employ five different measures: one based on the 
accruals quality measure proposed in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and four based on 
measures of discretionary accruals.  
     The first measure is based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality model 
which has been widely adopted in the literature.  The model defines accruals quality as 
the extent to which working capital accruals map into past, current, and future cash flow 
from operations.  Larger magnitude of the accruals estimation errors implies lower 
quality of accruals and earnings (Dechow and Dichev, 2002).  McNichols (2002), 
however, notes that the model’s focus on working capital accruals limits its applicability 
to firms with operations that are shorter-term in nature.  Hence, I also examine additional 
proxies of earnings quality based on estimates of discretionary accruals.  
     The four additional measures of earnings quality are based on discretionary accruals 
estimated from the Jones (1991) model and its variations.  As with the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model, the Jones (1991) model and its variations have been widely used in 
prior literature to study earnings quality, specifically, earnings management.  These 
discretionary accruals models focus on separating total accruals into discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components.  A set of accounting fundamentals is first used to estimate 
the model parameters.  The predicted value from the model is then interpreted as 
nondiscretionary accruals arising from normal operations and the residual as 
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discretionary. This discretionary portion is used as a measure of earnings management.  I 
discuss the specific discretionary accruals model used for each of the four earning quality 
proxies next. 
     The second measure of accruals-based earnings quality is derived from the original 
Jones (1991) model.  The model relies on the change in revenues and gross property, 
plant and equipment to partition total accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary 
portion, thus implicitly assuming that revenues are not subject to manipulations.  The 
third measure is based on the Jones (1991) model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995).  
Using a time-series setting, Dechow et al. (1995) propose that the change in revenues is 
adjusted for the change in accounts receivable during the event period in which 
nondiscretionary accruals are predicted, while the original Jones model is maintained in 
estimating the model parameters during the estimation period.  By doing so, the model 
assumes that the entire changes in credit sales are managed during the event period, but 
unmanaged during the estimation period. 
     The fourth and fifth measures are based the Jones (1991) and modified-Jones models 
used for the first and second measures, respectively, augmented to include return on 
assets, as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005).  The motivation for the inclusion of return 
on assets is to control for the effect of firm performance on estimated discretionary 
accruals (Kothari et al., 2005).  Also, for the fifth measure, following Francis et al. 
(2005a) and Kothari et al. (2005), the change in revenues is adjusted for the change in 
accounts receivable in both the estimations of the model parameters and nondiscretionary 
accruals.  This approach, in effect, assumes that all changes in credit sales represent 
earnings management.  As noted in Francis et al. (2005a), by not including the change in 
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accounts receivable in the estimation of nondiscretionary accruals, the Dechow et al.’s 
(1995) modification of the Jones (1991) model can overstate the estimated discretionary 
accruals for growing firms.   
     To arrive at each measure of accruals-based earnings quality, I first estimate the above 
five models cross-sectionally for each industry group (sector)2
     Note that there are two approaches used in the literature to implement the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and the discretionary accruals models: time-series and cross-sectional.  
Dechow and Dichev (2002), Jones (1991), and Dechow et al. (1995) originally use a 
time-series approach in their studies.  However, many subsequent studies apply the 
models in a cross-sectional setting (e.g., Aboody et al., 2005; Bharath et al., 2008; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Francis et al., 2005a; Kothari et al., 2005; Prawitt et al., 
2009); Raman and Shahrur, 2008).  The cross-sectional setting is more appropriate to this 
study because of less data requirement.  Also, a time-series approach introduce 
survivorship bias in the sample (Bharath et al., 2008; Ecker et al., 2006) 
 for each year in the 
sample.  If a sector has less than 10 observations in any given year, I estimate the model 
at the SET industry level.  (Table 2 shows the number of observations in each of the SET 
industry and sector from 2005-2007.)  The parameter estimates are then used to compute 
firm-specific residual for each firm each year.  The absolute values of the residuals from 
the estimation of the five models discussed above are the accruals-based measures of 
earnings quality used in this study.  The larger the absolute value, the lower is earnings 
quality.  A detailed description of how I arrive at each measure is provided below. 
                                                 
2 The industry groups used in this study are based on the classification by the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET).  The SET classifies listed firms into industries and sectors, approximately equivalent to one and two 
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry groups, respectively (see Table 2). 
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     Further, Dechow and Dichev (2002) use the standard deviation of the residuals as a 
measure of accrual quality.  They, however, note that using absolute value of the residual 
at a firm-year level provides qualitatively similar results. 
3.1.2.1 Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
     To estimate the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (hereafter DD), I first calculate 
total current accruals as: 
ititititit STDEBTCASHCLCATCA ∆+∆−∆−∆=  
where TCAit  is firm i’s total current accruals in year t; • CAit  is firm i’s change in current 
assets between year t-1 and year t; • CLit  is firm i’s change in current liabilities between 
year t-1 year t; • CASHit  is firm i’s change in cash between year t-1 year t; and 
• STDEBTit  is firm i’s change in short-term debt between year t-1 year t. 
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where CFOit is firm i’s total cash flow from operations in year t taken from the statement 
of cash flows; AVGAit is firm i’s average total assets over year t-1 year t. 
     The coefficients estimated from equation (2) are used to calculate firm-specific 
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where AA_DDit is firm i’s residual or abnormal accruals from DD in year t.  The first 
measure of accruals-based earnings quality (ABSAA_DDit) is the absolute value the firm’s 
residual or abnormal accruals from DD (|AA_DDit|). 
3.1.2.2 Jones (1991) model 
     The second accruals-based measure of earnings quality is based on the Jones (1991) 
model (hereafter J1).  I first define total accruals as: 
ititit CFOBNITA −=   
where TAit is firm i’s total accruals in year t; BNIit is firm i’s bottom line net income in 
year t; and CFOit is firm i’s total cash flow from operations in year t taken from the 
statement of cash flows.3































                                                              (3) 
where Ai,t-1 is firm i’s total assets at the beginning of year t; • REVit is firm i’s change in 
revenues between year t-1 and year t; and PPEit  is firm i’s net value of property, plant, 
and equipment4
                                                 
3 Some prior literature calculates total accruals by subtracting cash flow from continuing operations from 
net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations.  In such a case, the cash flow from 
continuing operations is derived from subtracting the cash portion of discontinued operations and 
extraordinary items from total cash flows from operations.  Since data for the cash portion of discontinued 
operations and extraordinary items is not available in Datastream for my sample, I calculate total accruals 
by subtracting total cash flow from operations from bottom line net income instead of from net income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (see, e.g., Hribar and Collins, 2002).] 
 in year t.   
4 As in Kothari et al. (2005), I use net value of property, plant and equipment in estimating the Jones 
model.  Other studies that use net property, plant and equipment include Guidry et al. (1999) and Myers et 
al. (2003).  I acknowledge that Jones (1991) and most studies use gross value of property, plant and 
equipment.  However, data for gross property, plant and equipment is not available in Datastream for the 
sample used in this study.  Data for depreciation or accumulated depreciation is also not available to allow 
for reconciliation between the net and gross values. 
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     The coefficients estimated in equation (3) are then used to estimate firm-specific 
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where NA_J1it is firm i’s nondiscretionary or normal accruals from J1 in year t. 











where AA_J1it is firm i’s discretionary or abnormal accruals from J1 in year t.  The 
second measure of accruals-based earnings quality (ABSAA_J1it) is the absolute value of 
discretionary or abnormal accruals from J1 (|AA_J1it|). 
3.1.2.3 Modified-Jones (1991) model 
     The third accruals-based measure of earnings quality is based on the Jones (1991) 
model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995) (hereafter MJ1).  To estimate firm-specific 
nondiscretionary or normal accruals, the parameter estimates from the cross-sectional 
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is firm i’s change in accounts receivable between year t-1 and year t. 5












where AA_MJ1it is firm i’s discretionary or abnormal accruals from MJ1 in year t.  The 
third measure of accruals-based earnings quality (ABSAA_MJ1it) is the absolute value of 
discretionary or abnormal accruals from MJ1 (|AA_MJ1it|). 
3.1.2.4 Performance-adjusted Jones (1991) model 
     The fourth accruals-based measure of earnings quality is based on the performance-
adjusted Jones (1991) model (hereafter J2), in which return on assets is added as an 
independent variable to J1 as shown in equation (4).  The cross-sectional regression of 
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where ROAit is firm i’s return on assets in year t, measured as the ratio of year t net 
income before extraordinary items to year t-1 total assets. 
     The coefficient estimates from the regression, in turn, are used to calculate firm-
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5 As discussed above and following the methodology used in prior literature, the changes in accounts 
receivable are deducted from revenues only in the calculation of nondiscretionary accruals, to capture any 
possibility of accounting discretion over the recognition of credit sales.  The model parameters are 
estimated for each industry using the Jones model, where the changes in accounts receivable are included in 
revenues. 
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where AA_J2it is firm i’s discretionary or abnormal accruals from J2 in year t.  The fourth 
measure of accruals-based earnings quality (ABSAA_J2it) is the absolute value of 
discretionary or abnormal accruals from J2 (|AA_J2it|). 
3.1.2.5 Performance-adjusted modified-Jones model 
     The fifth accruals-based measure of earnings quality is based on the performance-
adjusted modified Jones (1991) model (hereafter MJ2), in which MJ1 is augmented to 
include ROA as an independent variable as shown in equation (5).  The cross-sectional 
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     The coefficient estimates from the regression are then used to calculate firm-specific 
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where AA_MJ2it is firm i’s discretionary or abnormal accruals from MJ2 in year t.
6
3.2 Definition of a controlling shareholder 
  The 
fifth measure of accruals-based earnings quality (ABSAA_MJ2it) is the absolute value of 
discretionary or abnormal accruals from MJ2 (|AA_MJ2it|). 
     In this study, a controlling shareholder is a shareholder whose combined direct and 
indirect voting rights in the firm exceed 25%.  According to La Porta et al. (1999), the 
level of voting rights should be sufficient to allow a controlling shareholder to effectively 
                                                 
6 As discussed previously, in this model, the changes in accounts receivable are included in revenues in 
both the estimation of the model parameters and nondiscretionary accruals, assuming that all changes in 
accounts receivable result from earnings management.  This approach is employed by, for example, Kothari 
et al. (2005), Prawitt et al. (2009), and Raman and Shahrur (2008). 
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control the firm.  I employ 25% of voting rights as a cutoff level for the following 
reasons.  First, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) classifies a shareholder with direct 
or indirect voting rights in the firm greater than 25% as a controlling shareholder (SET, 
2009).  Second, a shareholder with greater than 25% of voting rights has absolute power 
to carry out a number of important activities in the firm that requires less than 25% of the 
votes under the Thai public company law, Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 (the 
Act).  These activities include demanding the board of directors to call an extraordinary 
meeting of shareholders at any time and submitting a request to the Minister of 
Commerce for an inspector to examine the firm’s operations, financial condition or the 
conduct of the board of directors (see Sersansie and Nimmansomboon, 1996 for an 
English translation of the Act; also see Wiwattanakantang, 2001).7
     A shareholder’s combined voting rights are determined using the method described in 
La Porta et al. (1999) as follows.  A shareholder has x% of direct voting rights in the firm 
by controlling x% of the votes through shares owned in the shareholder’s name.  A 
shareholder has x% of indirect voting rights in the firm by: (1) directly controlling more 
than 25% of the votes in another firm which, in turn, directly controls x% of the votes in 
the firm; or (2) directly controlling more than 25% of the votes in firm i which directly 
  Moreover, under the 
Act, 25% of voting rights are sufficient to block the firm’s critical activities that require 
at least 75% of the votes in the shareholders’ meeting.  These activities include, for 
example, merger, dissolution of the firm, and increase or decrease of the firm’s registered 
capital. 
                                                 
7 Other activities include making a motion to the court for an order to dissolve the company on the grounds 
specified by the Act, bringing a suit against any director who fails to act in accordance with the laws or the 
firm’s objectives and bylaws, and filing a motion with the court for an order to repeal shareholder 
resolution passed in violation of the Act or the company’s bylaws. 
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controls more than 25% of the votes in firm j, which, in turn, directly controls x% of the 
votes in the firm.  Note that there can be a series of firms between firm i and firm j as 
long as each firm controls more than 25% of the votes in the next firm leading to firm j.  
If there are two or more shareholders with more than 25% of voting rights, the controlling 
shareholder is the shareholder with the largest combined voting rights. 
3.3 Measure of audit committee effectiveness 
     To measure audit committee effectiveness, I create a composite measure that 
combines four audit committee characteristics into a single variable.  These four 
characteristics include audit committee size, the ratio of audit committee members with 
accounting financial expertise, average tenure of audit committee members, and average 
number of outside audit committee positions held by audit committee members.   
     Audit committee tenure is the number of years an audit committee member has served 
on the company’s audit committee.  The number of outside audit committee positions 
held includes only the number of audit committee positions held on the audit committee 
of other publicly listed companies on the SET main market.  Audit committee members 
with accounting financial expertise are those with experience preparing or auditing 
financial statements, for example, experience as a certified public accountant, auditor, 
controller, and senior accountant.  I also include audit committee members with 
experience as a university accounting professor as accounting financial expert.8
     To construct this composite variable, I first create a dummy variable for each of the 
four audit committee characteristics.  I then assign a value of 1 to the variable if the value 
   
                                                 
8 The reason for considering only audit committee members’ accounting financial expertise is motivated by 
DeFond et al. (2005) who find that only accounting-based financial skills, but not general financial skills, 
improve the effectiveness of an audit committee. 
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of the corresponding audit committee characteristic is above the sample median and 0 if 
the value is below the sample median.   In this regard, the value of 1 indicates more 
effectiveness and otherwise for the value of 0.  The reason for such coding is based on 
prior literature discussed earlier.  In particular, prior literature suggests that a larger audit 
committee or an audit committee containing more members with financial expertise, 
longer tenure, or more outside directorship is more effective at discharging its role in 
corporate governance. 
     Finally, I sum the value of the four dummy variables for each sample observation to 
create a composite measure of audit committee effectiveness, potentially ranging from 0 
to 4.  The larger the value, the more effective is an audit committee. 
3.4 Model specification and variable definitions 
     In this section, I describe the models used to test the hypotheses set forth Chapter 2. 
3.4.1 Controlling shareholders, audit committee effectiveness, and accounting 
conservatism 
     To test the hypotheses on the associations of controlling shareholders and audit 
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where NIit is firm i’s net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the 
beginning of year t; Rit is firm i’s buy-and-hold return over year t; NRDit equals 1 if Rit is 
negative, 0 otherwise; CSi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i has a controlling shareholder at the 
beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; FAMILYi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder 
at the beginning of year t is an individual or a family, 0 otherwise; WHLDi,t-1 equals 1 if 
firm i is a domestic corporation or financial institution that does not have a controlling 
shareholder at the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; GOVTi,y-1 equals 1 if firm i’s 
controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t is the domestic government or a 
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domestic government-related organization, 0 otherwise; FRGNi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s 
controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t is a foreign investor, 0 otherwise; 
VR25_50i,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder has more than 25% but less than 
or equal to 50% of voting rights in the firm at the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; 
VR50_75i,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder has between 50% and 75% of 
voting rights in the firm at the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; VR75i,t-1 equals 1 if firm 
i’s controlling shareholder has at least 75% of voting rights in the firm at the beginning of 
year t, 0 otherwise; ACEit is firm i’s level of audit committee effectiveness in year t, 
measured as a composite of four dummy variables for each of four characteristics of the 
firm’s audit committee: ratio of accounting financial expertise, size, average number of 
outside audit committee positions held, and average tenure.  Each dummy variable takes 
on a value of one if the value of the corresponding audit committee characteristic is 
above the sample median and zero otherwise; MTBt-1 is firm i’s market-to-book ratio, 
measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the beginning 
of year t; LEVt-1 is firm i’s leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets at 
the beginning of year t; and SIZEt-1 is firm i’s size, measured as the natural log of total 
assets at the beginning of year t.   
     Following Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008), market-to-book ratio, leverage and firm 
size are included in each of the above models as control variables.  I estimate equations 
(2), (3) and (4) above each for the full sample (2005-2007).  To alleviate concerns that 
endogeneity could be present in the relation between earnings quality and controlling 
ownership or audit committee effectiveness, I also estimate the above equations using a 
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subsample of data from 2006 and 2007 only (the data for controlling ownership and audit 
committee effectiveness is from 2005).   
     To further examine the effect of controlling shareholders on the association between 
audit committee effectiveness and accounting conservatism, I divide the full sample 
(2005-2007) and the subsample (2006-2007) into two groups, one with voting rights 
above 25% and the other with voting rights less than or equal to 25%.  I conduct separate 
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where all variables are as previously defined. 
3.4.2 Controlling shareholders, audit committee effectiveness, and accruals-based 
earnings quality 
     To test the hypotheses on the associations of controlling shareholders and audit 
committee effectiveness with accruals-based earnings quality, I employ the following 
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where EarningsQualityit is earnings quality measure for firm i in year t (ABSAA_DDit, 
ABSAA_J1it, ABSAA_MJ1it, ABSAA_J2it, or ABSAA_MJ2it); CSi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i has a 
controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; FAMILYi,t-1 equals 1 if 
firm i’s controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t is an individual or a family, 0 
otherwise; WHLDi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i is a domestic corporation or financial institution 
that does not have a controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; 
GOVTi,y-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t is the 
domestic government or a domestic government-related organization, 0 otherwise; 
FRGNi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t is a foreign 
investor, 0 otherwise; VR25_50i,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder has more 
than 25% but less than or equal to 50% of voting rights in the firm at the beginning of 
year t, 0 otherwise; VR50_75i,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder has between 
50% and 75% of voting rights in the firm at the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; VR75i,t-1 
equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder has at least 75% of voting rights in the firm at 
the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; ACEit is firm i’s level of audit committee 
effectiveness in year t, measured as a composite of four dummy variables for each of four 
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characteristics of the firm’s audit committee: ratio of accounting financial expertise, size, 
average number of outside audit committee positions held, and average tenure.  Each 
dummy variable takes on a value of one if the value of the corresponding audit committee 
characteristic is above the sample median and zero otherwise; MTBt-1 is firm i’s market-
to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at 
the beginning of year t; SGRWTHit is firm i’s sales growth in year t, measured as the 
change in sales between year t and year t-1 divided by sales in year t-1; ROAit is firm i’s 
return on assets in year t, measured as the ratio of year t net income before extraordinary 
items to year t-1 total assets; CFOit is firm i’s total cash flow from operations in year t 
taken from the statement of cash flows; VOLit is firm i’s volatility in year t, measured as 
the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous 12 months; LOPCit is 
firm i’s length of operating cycle in year t (calculated as: 360/[Sales/Average accounts 
receivable]+360/[Cost of goods sold/Average inventory]), in natural log form; LEVt-1 is 
firm i’s leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets at the beginning of 
year t; and SIZEt-1 is firm i’s size, measured as the natural log of total assets at the 
beginning of year t; and F_AGEit is firm i’s age in year t, measured as the natural log of 
number of years since the firm’s inception; Industryit are industry dummies based on 
industry classification by the Stock Exchange of Thailand, equal to 1 if firm i is from that 
industry group, 0 otherwise; Yearit are year dummies. 
     For each of the models above, I include standard control variables identified in 
previous research as being associated with abnormal accruals.  Also, following Hribar 
and Nichols (2007), I include volatility of operations as a control variable.  As mentioned 
above, I estimate each model for the full sample (2005-2007).  I also estimate each of the 
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models using a subsample of data from 2006 and 2007 only, to alleviate endogeneity 
concerns.   
     To gain further insight on the associations of controlling shareholders and audit 
committee effectiveness with earnings quality, I the following model using positive only 
and negative only abnormal accruals as dependent variables.  Positive or income-
increasing abnormal accruals can be used to inflate current period earnings.  Negative or 
income-decreasing abnormal accruals, on the other hand, can be used to take a “big bath” 
in earnings or to create “cookie-jar reserves” to allow for future period increase in 
earnings, especially in periods of weak financial performance.  Specifically, I estimate 
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where SignedAbnAccrualsit is signed abnormal accruals for firm i in year t (AA_DDit, 
AA_J1it, AA_MJ1it, AA_J2it, or AA_MJ2it); and all other variables are as previously 
defined. 
     To further examine whether controlling shareholders influence the relation between 
audit committee effectiveness and accruals-based earnings quality, I estimate the 
following model for the full sample (2005-2007) and the subsample (2006-2007).  I also 
divide each of the samples into two groups, one with voting rights above 25% and the 
other with voting rights less than or equal to 25%, and conduct separate OLS regressions 
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where all variables are as previously defined. 
3.5 Data and sample 
     This study uses data for non-financial public firms listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET)’s main market.  For the initial sample, I start with identifying firms that 
were listed on the SET’s main market at the end of 2005 from the SET Market Analysis 
and Reporting Tool (SETSMART) database9.  I then exclude firms in financial sector, 
firms listed during 2005, and firms with fiscal year-end other than 2005.  I also exclude 
firms whose shares were suspended from trading by the SET for most of or the entire 
200510 and firms under bankruptcy proceedings11
     Voting rights of shareholders are calculated for each firm in the 2005 sample.  As 
discussed earlier, in this study, a shareholder with more than 25% of voting rights in the 
firm is classified as a controlling shareholder.  Since multiple-class share structure is not 
allowed in Thailand, one share equals one vote.  Voting rights of a shareholder are thus 
calculated by combining direct and indirect ownership of the shareholder in the firm.  As 
an example of how I determine the voting rights, suppose shareholder A owns 15% of 
.  (These two groups of firms mostly 
overlap.)  Panel A of Table 1 describes the sample size and how I arrive at the 2005 
initial sample. 
                                                 
9 This database is developed by the Stock Exchange of Thailand.  It contains listed company information, 
news and historical trading prices. 
10 These are firms whose shareholders’ equity fell below zero. 
11 Shareholders of these firms transferred all the rights in the firms, except for the right to receive 
dividends, to the bankruptcy planner.  These firms held no annual shareholder meeting.  
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shares directly in the sample listed firm X and 28% directly in a private firm Y.  Firm Y, 
in turn, owns 20% of shares in firm X.  Since shareholder A owns more than 25% of firm 
Y, shareholder A is a controlling shareholder of firm Y, and hence, owns 20% of firm X 
indirectly through firm Y.  In this case, shareholder A’s voting rights in firm X are 35%, 
and hence a controlling owner of firm X.  If, instead, shareholder A owns only 20% of 
firm Y, shareholder A does not have control over firm Y.  Shareholder A’s voting rights 
in firm X are, therefore, only 15%.  In this case, if shareholder A and firm Y are the only 
major shareholders of firm X, firm X does not have a controlling shareholder (no 
shareholder with more than 25% of voting rights).  Note that a firm may have two or 
more shareholders with voting rights more than 25%.  In this case, a controlling 
shareholder is assigned to the shareholder with the highest voting rights in the firm. 
     For shareholders who are family members, their voting rights in the firm are combined 
and treated as voting rights of a shareholder.  In this study, family members include an 
individual’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, and relatives, whether by blood, marriage 
or adoption.  Individuals with the same last names are grouped as a family.  For 
individuals not having the same last names, I determine whether they are family members 
by consulting several sources: each firm’s Annual Disclosure Report (Form 56-1)12
     Data on shareholders and ownership for the calculation of voting rights is obtained 
from several sources.  Data on immediate (direct) ownership at the beginning of 2005 
, a 
two-book series titled 55 Prominent Families (Sappaiboon, 2000a, 2000b), a publication 
titled Thai Business Groups: A Unique Guide to Who Owns What (Brooker Group, 2003), 
and various Internet newspaper/magazine articles.   
                                                 
12 Each listed firm is required to submit this Form annually to the SET.  The Form provides information on 
family relationship of family members involved in management. 
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(around March or April) for each sample firm is obtained from SETSMART.  
SETSMART provides lists of all shareholders owning at least 0.5 percent of shares in 
each firm.  Data on shareholders and ownership of Thai private firms at the beginning of 
2005 is obtained from the Department of Business Development (DBD), Ministry of 
Commerce of Thailand.  In some cases when the list of shareholders at the beginning of 
2005 is not available at the DBD, I use the most recent list of shareholders from the 
Business Online (BOL) database13
     Data on audit committee characteristics used to construct a composite measure of 
audit committee effectiveness is collected for each 2005 sample firm.  A list of audit 
committee members at the end of 2005 is obtained from SETSMART and crosschecked 
with Form 56-1.  Data on the starting date of an audit committee member to compute 
audit committee tenure and on the number of audit committee positions held at other SET 
listed firms is obtained from SETSMART.  Data on audit committee size is also obtained 
from SETSMART.  Data on audit committee members’ qualifications used to determine 
.  Form 56-1 of each sample firm, in a few cases, 
provides sufficient information to determine whether the firm has a controlling 
shareholder along with the voting rights.  Information on foreign companies’ 
shareholders is gathered from several sources, including the company’s Web site (if 
available), annual reports (if available), Form 56-1, the company’s news and 
announcement submitted to the SET available from SETSMART, and other Internet 
resources.  A majority of foreign controlling shareholders are publicly listed firms in 
Japan, Hong Kong, or Singapore, and information on controlling shareholders is readily 
available in their annual reports. 
                                                 
13 The BOL database is provided by Business Online, a public company listed on the SET’s alternative 
market.  The company has a contract with the DBD to provide information of all companies registered with 
the DBD (essentially all companies registered in Thailand). 
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whether an audit committee is an accounting financial expert is collected from each 
firm’s Form 56-1 (multiple years), annual reports, Web site, and various Internet news 
articles.   
     The final sample uses financial data from 2005-2007 and corporate governance data 
from 2005.  To construct this sample, I start with 298 unique firms from the 2005 initial 
sample, thus yielding potential firm-years of 894.  Some firms in the 2005 initial sample, 
however, delisted in 2006 or 2007 and some firms’ stocks were suspended from trading 
for most of 2007.  Therefore, I exclude these firms.  Panel B of Table 1 describes the 
sample selection process of this 2005-2007 final sample. 
     Financial and stock returns data is obtained for each firm-year in the final sample 
(2005-2007) from Thomson Financial’s Worldscope database.  Missing financial data for 
some firms is supplemented with data from the firm’s financial statements obtained from 
SETSMART.  Corporate governance data, including data on controlling shareholders, 
voting rights, and audit committee characteristics, is collected for 2005 as described 
above.  For 2006-2007, I assume the 2005 corporate governance data applies to these two 
years as well.  For audit committee members’ tenure, I add one and two to the 2005 data 
and apply to 2006 and 2007 firm-years, respectively, assuming the 2005 audit committee 
members stay on to 2007.  This practice of applying corporate governance data for a 
certain year to other years has been done in prior research, for example, in Ali et al. 
(2007) for family firm classification, and in Fan and Wong (2002) for ownership data.  
The practice is based on the argument that corporate governance characteristics of firms 
tend to be sticky. 
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     Note that for the analysis using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, the sample size 
is reduced due to the requirement of data for cash flow from operations at time t+1.  
Panel C of Table 1 describes how I arrive at the final sample for the analysis using the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model.   
 
 44 
Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Results 
     This Chapter reports the descriptive information and statistics of variables used in the 
study and the results of the empirical tests.  It begins with the descriptive information on 
controlling shareholders and their voting rights, followed by the descriptive statistics of 
variables, and finally the results of the empirical results.   
4.1 Descriptive information on controlling shareholders and voting rights of 
controlling shareholders 
    Table 3 presents some information on type of shareholders constituted the 2005 initial 
sample, along with information on voting rights of controlling shareholders.  Panel A 
shows that approximately 83% of firms in the 2005 initial sample have a controlling 
shareholder as defined previously.  Approximately 63% of these firms are controlled by 
Thai families, with average voting rights of 50.58% in the firm.  Also as high as about 
90% of family-controlled firms are founding families.  Family controlling shareholders 
with family members involved in management, whether as a CEO or Chairman of the 
Board of Directors, have slightly higher average voting rights than those not involved in 
management.  Moreover, controlling shareholders that are widely-held corporations or 
financial institutions have lowest average voting rights compared to other types of 
controlling shareholders. 
     Panel B presents level of voting rights by type of controlling shareholder.  As shown 
in Panel B, 14 out of 188 family controlling shareholders have at least 75% voting rights 
in the firm.  Most of the government controlling shareholders have voting rights between 
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25%-50%.  Lastly, five foreign controlling shareholders that control at least 75% of the 
votes are the firm’s parent companies.   
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
     Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on controlling shareholders, audit committee 
effectiveness, measures of earnings quality, and other firm characteristics in the sample.  
Panel A is for variables used in accounting conservatism analysis.  Panels B and C are for 
variables used in analyses related to earnings quality.  Note that, as mentioned earlier, 
analyses related to accounting conservatism and discretionary-accruals-based earnings 
quality utilize the full sample of 883 firm-year observations.  Some of the same variables 
are also used in both analyses.  Sample size for analyses using the DD is reduced slightly 
due to some data requirement.   Therefore, I present summary statistics for all variables 
used in these analyses separately in Panel B. 
     Panel A of Table 4 shows that as expected, approximately 82% of firm-years have a 
controlling shareholder (CS), similar to that reported in Table 3 for firms in the 2005 
initial sample.  The proportion of each type of controlling shareholders in this full sample 
is also similar to those reported in Table 3 for firms in the 2005 initial sample, as should 
be expected.  For the voting rights of controlling shareholders, Panel A of Table 4 shows 
that approximately 44% of controlling shareholders in the sample have voting rights 
between 25%-50% (VR25_50), 32% between 50%-75% (VR50_75), and 7% at least 75% 
(VR_75).  For audit committee effectiveness (ACE), as discussed earlier, the highest 
possible value is 4 and the higher value implies more audit committee effectiveness.   The 
mean value of ACE is approximately 1.5 with the median of 1, implying that most firms 
in the sample do not have very high score on audit committee effectiveness.  Summary 
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statistics for controlling shareholder and audit committee effectiveness variables in Panel 
B of Table 4 for analyses using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are closely similar 
to those for the full sample.  
     For net income and returns variables, Panel A of Table 4 shows that, consistent with 
accounting conservatism, the median of NI is higher than the mean, indicating a left-
skewed distribution of earnings, while returns (R) is right-skewed.  The average annual 
buy-and-hold return (R) is approximately 9 %.  Also, less than half of the observations in 
the sample exhibit negative annual buy-and-hold returns.  The mean value of negative 
returns dummy (NRD) of shows approximately 46% of observations exhibit a negative 
annual buy-and-hold return. 
     Summary statistics for variables related to earnings quality are presented in Panels B 
and C of Table 4.  Abnormal accruals from DD, both absolute and signed (AA_DD and 
ABSAA_DD), are provided in Panel B.  Abnormal accruals from other accruals models, 
both absolute and signed (AA and ABSAA), are provided in Panel C.  As expected, the 
mean and median values of the signed abnormal accruals from all models are close to 
zero by construction.  The absolute value of abnormals from MJ1 (ABSAA_MJ1) has the 
highest mean, while that from DD (ABSAA_DD) has the lowest.   
Summary statistics for variables related to firm characteristics are similar for both 
samples.  Panels A and B of Table 4 show that average market-to-book ratio of firms in 
the sample is 1.4.  Panels B and C show that average sales growth is 10% and average 
ROA is 5%. 
     Table 5 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations among variables.  Pearson 
(Spearman) correlations appear above (below) the diagonal.  Panel A is for variables used 
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in accounting conservatism analysis.  Panel B are for variables used in analyses using DD 
and Panel C are for those using discretionary accruals models. 
     Overall, Table 5 shows that SIZE (firm size) is negatively correlated with FAMILY but 
positively correlated with GOVT.  This is to be expected since firms with the government 
as a controlling shareholder, such as State enterprises, tends to be of larger size.  Panel A 
of Table 5 also shows that GOVT is positively correlated with NI, suggesting that 
government-controlled firms are generally profitable.  For variables related to net income 
and returns, Panel A of Table 5 shows that NI is positively correlated with R and 
negatively correlated with NRD.  Such correlations suggest that accounting earnings 
incorporate at least some information impounded in returns.   
     For earnings quality variables, Panel C of Table 5 shows that the discretionary 
accruals measures of earnings quality (ABSAA_J1, ABSAA_MJ1, ABSAA_J2, and 
ABSAA_MJ2) are highly correlated. Also, CS is negatively correlated with ABSAA_J1 
and ABSAA_MJ1.  Together, Panels B and C of Table 5 show that VR50-75 is negatively 
correlated with all variables for earnings quality (ABSAA), suggesting that controlling 
shareholders with voting rights between 51% and 75% tend to have higher earnings 
quality.  Further, all variables for earnings quality are negatively correlated with F_AGE 
and ROA, while positively correlated with VOL and LOPC.  These associations indicate 
that younger firms and firms with lower performance, higher operating volatility, and 
longer operating cycle tend to generate larger residuals from the estimation of accruals 
models. 
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4.3 Contemporaneous association between earnings and returns  
     Table 6 presents OLS regression results of equation (1) for the Basu (1997) model.  
The coefficient β2 on stock return measures the sensitivity of accounting earnings to 
positive returns or good news.  The coefficient β3 on the interaction between stock return 
and the negative return dummy measures the incremental sensitivity of accounting 
earnings to negative returns or bad news.   
     Panel A of Table 6 shows that, for the full sample (2005-2007), β3 is positive and 
significant indicating more timely recognition of losses (bad news) relative to gains (good 
news).    In Panel B of Table 6, I divide observations of each sample into two groups 
based on whether the return was positive or negative.  Panel B of Table 6 shows that the 
adjusted R2 is higher for the negative return sample, indicating higher explanatory power 
of negative returns than positive returns.  The slope-coefficient is also higher for the 
negative return sample. Overall, in contrast to Ball et al. (2003), these results suggest that 
accounting conservatism is present in Thailand, at least during the sample periods.   
4.4 Comparison of the degree of accounting conservatism between groups 
     As discussed above, the coefficient β3 from the Basu (1997) model presented in 
equation (1) captures the incremental sensitivity of accounting earnings to negative 
returns or bad news.  This coefficient β3 is used in Table 7 and in this study as a measure 
of the degree of accounting conservatism.  
     The purpose of Table 7 is to provide an overview picture of whether there is any 
difference in the degree of accounting conservatism between different types of groups in 
the sample.  I estimate a separate regression of equation (1) for each group.  Then, I use 
 49 
the Chow test to determine whether the difference in β3 coefficients between groups is 
significantly different from zero.  Panel A of Table 7 shows the comparison of the degree 
of conservatism between groups with different types of shareholders.  In Panel B of Table 
7, for composite measure of audit committee effectiveness, observations are divided into 
two groups based on the value of each observation, whether above or below the sample 
median. 
     Overall, Panel A of Table 7 shows that there are some differences in the degree of 
accounting conservatism among groups especially between firms with no controlling 
shareholder and firms with a controlling shareholder.  In particular, firms with a 
controlling shareholder are shown to report a lower degree of accounting conservatism 
than firms with no controlling shareholder in general.  Firms controlled by widely-held 
corporations or financial institution report a lower degree of accounting conservatism 
when compared to firms with no controlling shareholder but not to firms with other types 
of controlling shareholders.  Firms whose controlling shareholder has voting rights 
between 50% and 75% are shown to report a lower degree of accounting conservatism 
than both firms with no controlling shareholder and firm whose controlling shareholder 
has different level of voting rights.  Lastly, Panel B of Table 7 shows no significant 
difference in the degree of accounting conservatism between firms whose audit 
committee possess stronger governance characteristics and their counterparts. 
4.5 Controlling shareholders, audit committee effectiveness and accounting 
conservatism 
     Table 8 reports regression results of equation (2).  Panel A reports the results for the 
full sample (2005-2007).  To alleviate endogeneity concerns, as mentioned earlier, I also 
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report the results for the subsample (2006-2007) in Panel B.  Since the asymmetric 
timeliness of bad news relative to good news (the degree of accounting conservatism) is 
of interest here, I will focus the discussion mainly on the interaction between R*NRD and 
the test variables.  Both Panels A and B of Table 8 present three regressions.  In 
regression (1), to examine the relation between controlling shareholders and accounting 
conservatism before controlling for audit committee effectiveness, only the variable CS, 
its interaction terms, and control variables are included in model.   In regression (2), in 
contrast to regression (1), only the variable ACE, its interaction terms, and control 
variables are included in the model, to see the relation between audit committee 
effectiveness and accounting conservatism before controlling for CS.  Regression (3) 
includes all variables. 
     In Panel A of Table 8, the coefficients on R*NRD*CS in both regressions (1) and (3) 
are negative and significant, indicating that firms with a controlling shareholder are less 
asymmetrically timely in recognizing bad news, compared to firms with no controlling 
shareholder.  Similar results are shown in Panel B for the subsample (2006-2007).  For 
the audit committee variable, both Panels A and B of Table 8 show insignificant 
coefficients on R*NRD*ACE in regressions (2) and (3), suggesting that there is no 
difference in the degree of accounting conservatism between firms whose audit 
committee possesses stronger governance characteristics and weaker governance 
characteristics, whether or not CS is controlled for. 
     Table 9 reports regressions results of equations (3) and (4).  Panel A reports the results 
for the full sample (2005-2007) and Panel B for the subsample (2006-2007).  Focusing 
first on Panel A of Table 9, three columns on the left present the results of the relation 
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between different types of controlling shareholders and accounting conservatism.  The 
coefficients on R*NRD*FAMILY, R*NRD*WHLD and R*NRD*GOVT are significantly 
negative, suggesting that firms whose controlling shareholder is a family, a widely-held 
firm or financial institution, or the government are less asymmetrically timely in 
recognizing bad news than firms with no controlling shareholder.  Three columns on the 
right present the results of the relation between different levels of voting rights of 
controlling shareholders and accounting conservatism.  The coefficients on 
R*NRD*VR25_50 and R*NRD*VR50_75 are significantly negative, suggesting that firms 
whose controlling shareholder has voting rights between 25%-50% and between 50%-
75% report less conservative accounting earnings than firms with no controlling 
shareholder.  For the audit committee effectiveness variable, the coefficient on 
R*NRD*ACE is insignificant in Panel A of Table 9, suggesting no difference in 
accounting conservatism between firms with higher governance quality audit committee 
and lower quality one.  Panel B of Table 9 reports similar results to those discussed for 
Panel A of Table 9. 
     To further examine whether the role of the audit committee is different in firms with 
and without a controlling shareholder, the full sample (2005-2007) and the subsample 
(2006-2007), each are divided into two subgroups using the voting rights level of 25% as 
a cut off.   
     Table 10 reports the results of the regression of equation (4) performed for each of the 
four subgroups.  For the full sample (2005-2007), the coefficient on R*NRD*ACE is 
significantly negative for firms with no controlling shareholders, but not significant for 
firms with a controlling shareholder.  The results seem to suggest that the role of the audit 
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committee is moderated in firms with a controlling shareholder.  The results for the 
subsample (2006-2007), however, show insignificant coefficient on R*NRD*ACE for 
both firms with and without a controlling shareholder.  Given that the regression of the 
subsample (2006-2007) should provide more robust results than that of the full sample 
(2005-2007), I interpret the results in Table 10 as do not provide evidence that the role of 
the audit committee is different in firms with and without a controlling shareholder. 
4.6 Controlling shareholders, audit committee effectiveness and accruals-based 
earnings quality 
     Table 11 presents the results of the regression of equation (6) of five accruals-based 
earnings quality measures on controlling shareholders and audit committee effectiveness.  
Panel A presents the results for the full sample (2005-2007).  Panel B presents the results 
for the subsample (2006-2007).  The coefficient on CS, although not significant in Panel 
A of Table 11, is negative and significant in four models in Panel B.  Given that the 
regression performed using the subsample of 2006-2007 should help reduce endogeneity 
bias, if any, in the full sample regression, these results suggest firms with a controlling 
shareholder have better earnings quality than their counterparts.  The coefficient on ACE, 
however, is not significant in all models in both Panels A and B of Table 11. 
     Table 12 reports the results of the regression of equation (7).  Accruals-based earnings 
quality measures are regressed on different types of controlling shareholders and audit 
committee effectiveness.  Panel A reports the results of the regression run on the full 
sample (2005-2007), and Panel B on the subsample (2006-2007).  Panel A of Table 12 
shows that the coefficient on FAMILY is negative and significant in the regressions using 
absolute values of discretionary or abnormal accruals from J1 and MJ1.  The coefficient 
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on GOVT is also negative and significant in the regression using absolute values of 
abnormal accruals from MJ2.  As in Table 11, Table 12 shows stronger results for the 
subsample (2006-2007) in Panel B than for the full sample (2005-2007) in Panel A.  In 
Panel B of Table 12, the coefficient on FAMILY is negative and significant in all five 
models.  The coefficient on WHLD is negative and significant in the regression using 
absolute value of abnormal accruals from DD.  The coefficient on GOVT is negative and 
significant in four models.  Lastly, the coefficient on FRGN is negative and significant in 
the regression using absolute values of abnormal accruals from J1 and J2.  These results 
are consistent with those in Table 11 and, overall, suggest that firms with a controlling 
shareholder, especially family and the government controlling shareholders, are 
associated with higher accruals-based earnings quality than firms with no controlling 
shareholder.  As in Table 11, the coefficient on ACE is insignificant is all models in both 
Panels A and B of Table 12. 
     Table 13 summarizes the results of the regression of equation (8), in which accruals-
based earnings quality measures are regressed on different levels of voting rights of 
controlling shareholders and audit committee effectiveness.  Again, Panel A summarizes 
the results of the regression run on the full sample (2005-2007), and Panel B on the 
subsample (2006-2007).  Panel A of Table 13 shows that VR50-75 is significantly 
negatively related to measures of earnings quality in three models.  As in previous tables, 
Table 13 shows stronger results for the subsample (2006-2007) in Panel B than for the 
full sample (2005-2007) in Panel A.  Panel B of Table 13 shows that VR25-50 is 
significantly negatively related to measures of earnings quality in four models and VR50-
75 in all models.  Panel B of Table 13 also shows that VR75 is significantly negatively 
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related to ABSAA_J1, the absolute value of abnormal accruals from J1.  These results 
suggest that firms with a controlling shareholder, especially those with voting rights 
below 75%, are associated with higher accruals-based earnings quality than firms with no 
controlling shareholder.  The coefficient on ACE, consistent with previous tables, is 
insignificant in all model in both Panels A and B of Table 13. 
     Table 14 reports the results of the regressions of equation (9) using positive only and 
negative only abnormal accruals as dependent variables.  As mentioned earlier, positive 
or income-increasing abnormal accruals can be used to inflate current period earnings, 
while negative or income-decreasing abnormal accruals can be used to increase future 
period earnings.  The results are shown in Table 14.  Panels A and B of Table 14 reports 
the results for the full sample (2005-2007) and Panels C and D for the subsample (2006-
2007).  Moreover, Panels A and C of Table 14 reports the results for positive only 
abnormal accruals as dependent variables, and Panels B and D for negative only. 
     For positive or income-increasing abnormal accruals and controlling shareholder 
variables, only the coefficient on FRGN is significant and is positive, as shown in Panel 
A of Table 14 for the full sample (2005-2007).  For negative or income-decreasing 
abnormal accruals and controlling shareholder variables, Panel B of Table 14 shows that 
the coefficient on FAMILY is positive and significant in all models.  These results are 
consistent with those shown in Panel D of Table 14 for the subsample (2006-2007), 
where the coefficient on FAMILY is also positive and significant in four of five models.                       
     For other types of controlling shareholders, Panel B of Table 4 shows that GOVT is 
significantly positively related to income-decreasing abnormal accruals from MJ2, 
consistent with the results shown in Panel D of Table14 for the subsample (2006-2007) 
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where GOVT is significantly positively related to income-decreasing abnormal accruals 
from J2 and MJ2.  Further, Panel D of Table 14 reports that WHLD is significantly 
positively related to income-decreasing abnormal accruals from J2 and MJ2 and FRGN is 
significantly positively related to income-decreasing abnormal accruals from J1, J2 and 
MJ2.   
     The results on the relation between signed abnormal accruals and controlling 
shareholder variables shown in Table 14 above indicate that the positive (negative) 
association between accruals-based earnings quality (absolute value of abnormal 
accruals) and firms with a controlling shareholder reported in previous tables is largely 
driven by negative abnormal accruals.  Overall, the results suggest that firms with a 
controlling shareholder, especially a family controlling shareholder, are less involved in 
income-decreasing activities, such as taking a big bath on earnings or creating cookie-jar 
reserves, than firms with no controlling shareholder.  There is, however, only weak 
evidence suggesting that firms with foreign controlling shareholders are more involved in 
income-increasing behavior than firms with no controlling shareholder. 
     With respect to ACE, Panel C of Table 14 for the subsample (2006-2007) shows that 
ACE is significantly positively related to positive or income-increasing abnormal accruals 
from J1 and MJ1.  For negative or income-decreasing abnormal accruals, both Panel B of 
Table 14 for the full sample (2005-2007) and Panel D for the subsample (2006-2007) 
show that ACE is significantly negatively related to AA_MJ2.  These results provide some 
evidence, which is unexpected and inconsistent with prior studies, that an audit 
committee with more desirable governance characteristics as suggested in prior studies is 
less effective at constraining income-increasing and -decreasing activities. 
 56 
     Given a general lack of significant relation between audit committee effectiveness and 
accruals-based earnings quality shown in previous tables, Tables 15 and 16 report the 
results from further examination of whether controlling shareholders influence the 
relation between audit committee effectiveness and accruals-based earnings quality.  
Table 15 presents the results from regressing accruals-based earnings quality measures on 
the measure of audit committee effectiveness according to equation (10).  Variables 
related to controlling shareholders are excluded from the model.  Panel A presents the 
results for the full sample (2005-2007) and Panel B for the subsample (2006-2007).  Both 
Panels A and B of Table 15 show that even before controlling for variables related to 
controlling shareholder, ACE is not significantly related to measures of accruals-based 
earnings quality. 
     For Table 16, the regression of accruals-based earnings quality measures on the 
measure of audit committee effectiveness, per equation (10), is performed separately for 
subgroups of firms with a controlling shareholder and with no controlling shareholder.  
The objective is to examine more closely whether there is any difference in the 
association of audit committee effectiveness with accruals-based earnings quality 
between firms with a controlling shareholder and those with no controlling shareholder.  
Panels A and C of Table 16 report the results for firms with a controlling shareholder 
using the full sample (2005-2007) and subsample (2006-2007), respectively, Panels B 
and C report the results for firms with no controlling shareholder.  The results show that 
the coefficient on ACE is insignificant in all models in all panels.   
     The results in Tables 15 and 16 suggest that first, there is no difference in the 
association with accruals-based earnings quality between audit committees possessing 
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stronger governance quality as suggested in previous research and their counterparts with 
weaker quality, and second, such lack of association is not influenced by the presence of 
controlling shareholders. 
     In summary, the results in this section provide evidence that firms with a controlling 
shareholder are associated with higher accruals-based earnings quality than their 
counterparts with no controlling shareholder.  The results are strong especially for firms 
with family or the government as controlling shareholders and firms whose controlling 
shareholders’ voting rights are below 75%.  The results also suggest that this negative 
relation is primarily driven by the relation between firms with a controlling shareholder 
and negative or income-decreasing abnormal accruals.  In particular, the results provide 
strong evidence that firms with family controlling shareholders are less involved in 
income-decreasing activities than firms with no controlling shareholder.  The results, 
however, do not provide evidence that audit committees with stronger governance 
characteristics are associated with higher accruals-based earnings quality.   
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Chapter 5: Additional Analysis 
     This Chapter presents additional analyses to gain further insight into the results from 
the main empirical tests.  First, it presents an analysis on the relation between controlling 
shareholders and firm performance.  Then it presents an analysis using an alternative 
measure of ownership concentration. 
5.1 Controlling shareholders and firm performance 
     In this section, I examine the effect of controlling shareholders on firm performance.  
The regression results discussed in the previous section suggest that firms with a 
controlling shareholder are associated with higher accruals-based earnings quality, but 
with less accounting conservatism than firms with no controlling shareholder.  The 
results for accounting conservatism appear to be consistent with the predictions of both 
the entrenchment effect and the demand for accounting conservatism arguments.  In an 
attempt to gain further insight into which of these arguments help explain the results on 
the relation between controlling shareholders and accounting conservatism, I conduct an 
additional analysis to determine whether firms with a controlling shareholder over or 
under perform those with no controlling shareholder.14
                                                 
14 Wiwattanakantang (2001) has done a similar analysis on a 1996 sample of Thai listed firms.  She finds 
that firms with a controlling shareholder outperform their counterparts. 
  In this case, the entrenchment 
effect argument would predict underperformance of firms with a controlling shareholder, 
while the demand for accounting conservatism would predict the opposite. 
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5.1.1 Model specification and variable definitions 
     To test the effect of controlling shareholders on firm performance, I employ the 
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where PERFORMANCEit is performance measure for firm i in year t [ROA, 
ROA(EBITDA), or Tobin’s q]; ROA is return on assets, measured as the ratio of net 
income before extraordinary items to beginning-of-period total assets; ROA(EBITDA) is 
return on assets, measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization to beginning-of-year total assets; Tobin's q is ratio of the firm’s market 
value to total assets, measured as the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of 
preferred stock and total debt to total assets; CSi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i has a controlling 
shareholder at the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; FAMILYi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s 
controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t is an individual or a family, 0 
otherwise; WHLDi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i is a domestic corporation or financial institution 
that does not have a controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; 
GOVTi,y-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t is the 
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domestic government or a domestic government-related organization, 0 otherwise; 
FRGNi,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder at the beginning of year t is a foreign 
investor, 0 otherwise; VR25_50i,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder has more 
than 25% but less than or equal to 50% of voting rights in the firm at the beginning of 
year t, 0 otherwise; VR50_75i,t-1 equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder has between 
50% and 75% of voting rights in the firm at the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; VR75i,t-1 
equals 1 if firm i’s controlling shareholder has at least 75% of voting rights in the firm at 
the beginning of year t, 0 otherwise; SGRWTHit is firm i’s sales growth in year t, 
measured as the change in sales between year t and year t-1 divided by sales in year t-1; 
VOLit is firm i’s volatility in year t, measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over the previous 12 months; and F_AGEit is firm i’s age in year t, measured as 
the natural log of number of years since the firm’s inception; Industryit are industry 
dummies based on industry classification by the Stock Exchange of Thailand, equal to 1 
if firm i is from that industry group, 0 otherwise; Yearit are year dummies. 
5.1.2 Results 
5.1.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
     Panel A of Table 17 presents summary statistics of additional variables not used in 
prior analysis.  Panel B of Table 17 presents Pearson and Spearman correlation of 
variables used in this analysis.  Panel A shows that the mean ROA calculated using 
EBIT, ROA (EBITDA), is approximately 13%, and the mean Tobin’s q is approximately 
1.2.   For comparison purpose, the mean ROA calculated using net income before extra-
ordinary items presented in Panel C of Table 4 is approximately 5.2%. 
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     Panel B of Table 17 shows that GOVT is correlated with all three performance 
measures.  CS is correlated with ROA (EBITDA) using Spearman correlation.  All three 
measures of performance, as expected, are also correlated. 
5.1.2.2 Controlling shareholders and firm performance 
     Table 18 presents regression results of equations (11) through (13).  Panel A of Table 
18 shows that the coefficient on CS is significantly positive in all three models using 
three measures of performance.  Panel B of Table 18 shows that the coefficient on 
FAMILY is significant in all three models, and the coefficient on GOVT is significant in 
models with ROA and ROA(EBITDA) as dependent variables.  These results suggest that 
family- and the government-controlled firms are significantly and positively associated 
with firm performance.  Panel C of Table 18 presents results of the relation between 
different level of voting rights of controlling shareholders and firm performance.  The 
results show that the VR25-50 is significantly positively related to all measures of 
performance, while VR50_75 is significantly positively related to ROA and 
ROA(EBITDA). 
     The results presented here suggest that firms with a controlling shareholder, especially 
family- and the government-controlled firms, overperform firms with no controlling 
shareholder.  Firms whose voting rights of the controlling shareholder are below 75 are 
also found to over perform firms with no controlling shareholders.  As such, it seems that 
the entrenchment effect may not be the reason for less accounting conservatism among 
firms with a controlling shareholder, but rather the lack of demand for accounting 
conservatism. 
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5.2 Alternative ownership concentration measure 
     Following La Porta et al. (1999), this study uses ultimate ownership as a measure in 
determining whether a firm has a controlling shareholder with voting rights more than 
25%.  As discussed previously, shares of firms in Thailand and most of East Asia are 
often owned through a web of several to many public and private firms.  Ultimate 
ownership, thus, should be an appropriate way to identify true ownership and control.  
Several prior studies, however, have used immediate ownership as an ownership 
concentration measure.  For example, Leuz et al. (2005) use the percentage of common 
shares owned by the largest three shareholders as a measure of ownership concentration.  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) consider top five and top 20 shareholders.  Therefore, in this 
section, I conduct additional analyses using the percentage of shares owned by top three 
and top five shareholders as independent variables instead of controlling shareholder 
variables. 
5.2.1 Top three and top five shareholders 
     For this additional analysis, I collected data on the three and five largest shareholders 
of each firm from the SETSMART database.  The data is collected for each year from 
2005 to 2007.  Then, for each firm, I calculate the combined ownership stake of these 
three and five shareholders and use as alternative measures of ownership concentration.  
For the final sample of 883 firm-years, the mean (median) ownership of the top three and 
top five shareholders are approximately 49% (47%) and 58% (57.5%), respectively.  The 
mean and median ownership of the top three and top five shareholders for the sample of 
873 firm-years to be used in analyses using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are 
closely similar to those of the full 883 firm-year sample. 
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5.2.2 Model specification and variable definitions 
     To test the associations of alternative ownership concentration and audit committee 
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where NIit is firm i’s net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the 
beginning of year t; Rit is firm i’s buy-and-hold return over year t; NRDit equals 1 if Rit is 
negative, 0 otherwise; OWNi,t-1 is firm i’s ownership concentration at the beginning of 
year t (TOP3 or TOP5); ACEit is firm i’s level of audit committee effectiveness in year t, 
measured as a composite of four dummy variables for each of four characteristics of the 
firm’s audit committee: ratio of accounting financial expertise, size, average number of 
outside audit committee positions held, and average tenure.  Each dummy variable takes 
on a value of one if the value of the corresponding audit committee characteristic is 
above the sample median and zero otherwise; MTBt-1 is firm i’s market-to-book ratio, 
measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the beginning 
of year t; LEVt-1 is firm i’s leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets at 
the beginning of year t; and SIZEt-1 is firm i’s size, measured as the natural log of total 
assets at the beginning of year t. 
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     To test the associations of alternative ownership concentration and audit committee 
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where EarningsQualityit is earnings quality mesure for firm i in year t (ABSAA_DDit, 
ABSAA_J1it, ABSAA_MJ1it, ABSAA_J2it, or ABSAA_MJ2it); OWNi,t-1 is firm i’s 
ownership concentration at the beginning of year t (TOP3 or TOP5); ACEit is firm i’s 
level of audit committee effectiveness in year t, measured as a composite of four dummy 
variables for each of four characteristics of the firm’s audit committee: ratio of 
accounting financial expertise, size, average number of outside audit committee positions 
held, and average tenure.  Each dummy variable takes on a value of one if the value of 
the corresponding audit committee characteristic is above the sample median and zero 
otherwise; MTBt-1 is firm i’s market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of market value 
of equity to book value of equity at the beginning of year t; SGRWTHit is firm i’s sales 
growth in year t, measured as the change in sales between year t and year t-1 divided by 
sales in year t-1; ROAit is firm i’s return on assets in year t, measured as the ratio of year t 
net income before extraordinary items to year t-1 total assets; CFOit is firm i’s total cash 
flow from operations in year t taken from the statement of cash flows; VOLit is firm i’s 
volatility in year t, measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 
previous 12 months; LOPCit is firm i’s length of operating cycle in year t [calculated as: 
360/(Sales/Average accounts receivable)+360/(Cost of goods sold/Average inventory)]; 
LEVt-1 is firm i’s leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets at the 
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beginning of year t; and SIZEt-1 is firm i’s size, measured as the natural log of total assets 
at the beginning of year t; and F_AGEit is firm i’s age in year t, measured as the natural 
log of number of years since the firm’s inception; Industryit are industry dummies based 
on industry classification by the Stock Exchange of Thailand, equal to 1 if firm i is from 
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where SignedAbnAccrualsit is signed abnormal accruals for firm i in year t (AA_DDit, 
AA_J1it, AA_MJ1it, AA_J2it, or AA_MJ2it); and all other variables are as previously 
defined. 
5.2.3 Ownership concentration, audit committee effectiveness, and accounting 
conservatism 
     Table 19 presents the results of the regression of equation (14).  The left panel of 
Table 19 is the results for the top three shareholders and the right panel for the top five 
shareholders.  The results show that the coefficients on R*NRD*TOP3 and 
R*NRD*TOP5 are negative and significant, suggesting that ownership concentration is 
negatively related to accounting conservatism.  These results are consistent with the 
results for the controlling shareholder dummy variable shown in Table 8.  The coefficient 
on R*NRD*ACE 
     Table 20 presents the results on the associations of ownership concentration and audit 
committee effectiveness with the measures of accruals-based earnings quality from the 
regression of equation (15).  Panel A of Table 20 reports the results of the regression 
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using TOP3 as an independent variable and Panel B of Table 20 reports the regression 
using TOP5.  The coefficients on TOP3 and TOP5 are insignificant, suggesting that 
ownership concentration is not associated with accruals-based measure of earnings 
quality.  These results are similar to the results for controlling dummy variable as a 
dependent variable presented in Panel A Table 11.  The coefficient on ACE is also 
insignificant in both Panels A and B of Table 20. 
    Table 21 reports the results of the regressions of equation (16) for subsamples of 
positive only and negative only abnormal accruals.  Panels A and C of Table 21 report 
the results for positive abnormal accruals only of top three and five shareholders, 
respectively, while Panels B and D for negative abnormal accruals only.  The coefficients 
on TOP3 and TOP5 are not significant in Panels A and C of Table 21 for positive 
abnormal accruals only.  For negative abnormal accruals only, Panel B of Table 21 shows 
that the coefficient on TOP3 is positive and significant in four models.  Panel D of Table 
21 shows similar results for TOP5.  These results indicate that ownership concentration is 
negatively related to income-decreasing abnormal accruals. 
     With respect to audit committee effectiveness variable, ACE is significantly positively 
related to AA_J1 in Panel A of Table 21 for positive abnormal accruals only.  For 
negative abnormal accruals only, ACE is significantly negatively related to AA_MJ2 in 
both Panels B and D of Table 21.  Similar to the results reported in Table 14, the results 
in Table 21 provide some weak evidence that audit committee effectiveness is not 
associated with mitigating income increasing or decreasing abnormal accruals. 
     Overall, the above analyses shows that using an alternative measure of ownership 
concentration deriving from immediate ownership provides similar results as using the 
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measure deriving from ultimate ownership.  The reason could be that the use of 
pyramiding to separate voting rights from cash-flow rights is not prevalent in Thailand, as 
suggested by Claessens et al. (2002).  This finding by no means suggests that one should 
simply use immediate ownership in all cases, as the use of ultimate ownership is 
theoretically more appropriate and would provide researchers with better understanding 
of how firms are owned and controlled through layers of affiliated firms. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
     In this study, I investigate whether firms with a controlling shareholder are associated 
with earnings quality, and whether high quality audit committees are associated with 
earnings quality.  I test the hypotheses using a unique data set of Thai listed firms on 
voting rights of controlling shareholders and audit committee characteristics collected for 
2005.  I use Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure of accounting conservatism 
and absolute abnormal accruals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) and the Jones 
(1991) models and its three variations as proxies for earnings quality.  I also create a 
composite measure of audit committee effectiveness using four audit committee 
characteristics to capture the strength of each firm’s audit committee.  These four audit 
committee characteristics are size, ratio of members with accounting financial expertise, 
average tenure of members, and average number of members’ outside audit committee 
position held. 
     For the association between controlling shareholders and accounting conservatism, the 
study provides evidence that firms with a controlling shareholder are associated with less 
conservative accounting earnings.   Further examination suggests that family- and the 
government-controlled firms and firms whose controlling shareholders hold voting rights 
below 75%, in particular, are associated with less conservative accounting earnings.   
These findings are consistent with both the entrenchment effect of concentrated 
ownership argument and the argument that insider networks replace the need for quality 
financial reporting.  Further analysis shows that firms with a controlling shareholder are 
associated with better performance than firms with no controlling shareholder.  This 
further analysis provides some support for the argument of low demand for quality 
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financial reporting in explaining the negative relation between controlling shareholders 
and accounting conservatism. 
     For the association between controlling shareholders and absolute abnormal accruals, 
the analysis suggests that firms with a controlling shareholder are associated with lower 
absolute abnormal accruals.  Further analysis suggests that, similar to the results for the 
analysis using accounting conservatism measure, firms with family and the government 
controlling shareholders and firms whose controlling shareholders have voting rights 
below 75% are associated with lower absolute abnormal accruals.  An additional analysis 
of signed abnormal accruals shows that the association between controlling shareholders 
and absolute abnormal accruals are primarily driven by the negative association of firms 
with a controlling shareholder with negative or income-decreasing abnormal accruals.  
These findings, in contrast to those for the analysis using accounting conservatism, are 
consistent with both the incentive alignment of concentrated ownership argument and the 
argument that outside investors demand high quality financial reporting to protect their 
interests.  Given that absolute abnormal accruals are used as a proxy for earnings 
management, the analysis seems to suggest that firms with a controlling shareholder are 
less involved in earnings management, especially income-decreasing earnings 
management such as taking a big bath on earnings and cookie-jar accounting, than firms 
with no controlling shareholder. 
     A closer examination of the associations of controlling shareholders with accounting 
conservatism and with absolute abnormal accruals, however, suggests that the lower 
absolute abnormal accruals for firms with a controlling shareholder is not the result of 
these firms’ less involvement in earnings management.  Rather, the lower absolute 
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abnormal accruals for firms with a controlling shareholder are largely because these firms 
are less timely in recognizing losses than firms with no controlling shareholder. 
     For the association between audit committee effectiveness and earnings quality, this 
study suggests that there is no systematic difference in earning quality between firms 
whose audit committees possess stronger and weaker governance characteristics.  This 
finding is inconsistent with some prior studies on the relation between audit committee 
effectiveness and earnings quality.  This finding, thus, also raises questions on whether 
the same corporate governance mechanisms will be effective across countries with 
different institutional contexts, and whether policy recommendations on corporate 
governance based on best practice guidelines from countries with dispersed ownership 
such the U. S. are always appropriate for countries with concentrated ownership. 
     This study has several limitations that require mention.  First, this study focuses on 
one country.  While this focus allows for more accurate and comprehensive data on 
ultimate ownership and audit committee characteristics than for some prior cross-country 
studies, it may limit generalizability of the study.  Second, the data on ultimate ownership 
and audit committee characteristics is collected for 2005 only due to the time required in 
the data collection process.  Although, based on prior studies, this corporate governance 
data tends to be sticky, this study could be extended to include the data specific for each 
year.  Third, only voting rights of controlling shareholders are examined in this study.  
An addition of cash-flow rights to the study could provide further insight into how the 
divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights could affect earnings quality 
among sample firms.  Fourth, measures of earnings quality used in this study, accounting 
conservatism and abnormal accruals, are only two of several measures proposed in prior 
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studies.  While these two measures are widely used in prior research, additional measures 
of earnings quality could also be used.  Finally, the composite measure of audit 
committee effectiveness is constructed based on four audit committee characteristics.  
These characteristics, while chosen based on prior literature, are not comprehensive and 
may not capture all the dimensions of an effective audit committee. 
     Several limitations discussed above provide some opportunities for future research.  
First, the data collection could be extended to cover ultimate ownership and audit 
committee characteristics for each year, and to cover cash-flow rights of controlling 
shareholders.  Second, additional measures of earnings quality proposed in prior literature 
such as earnings persistence and smoothness could be examined to provide further 
insight.  Finally, more comprehensive audit committee characteristics could be used to 




Table 1  Derivation of sample 




Firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)'s main market 
 at the end of 2005 468 
Firms excluded from the sample: 
    Financial firms (63) 
   Firms whose stock trading was suspended for most of or the entire 
2005   
       and/or firms under bankruptcy proceedings during 2005 (52) 
   Firms listed during 2005 (36) 
   Firms with fiscal year-end other than 31 December (19) 
Final 2005 initial sample 298 




Potential firm-years 2005-2007 (final 2005 initial sample x 3) 894 
Firm-years excluded from the sample: 
      Firms delisted from the SET in 2006 (1 firm) (2) 
     Firms delisted from the SET in 2007 (5 firms) (5) 
     Firms whose stock trading was suspended for most of 2007 (4) 
Final full sample (2005-2007) 883 
    




Final full sample 2005-07 883 
Less firm-years with no required cash flow from operations at time t+1 data  
(mainly due to delisting during 2006 and 2008) (10) 
Final sample for analyses using the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model 873 




Table 2  Sample distribution by industry and sector as classified by the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
               For analyses using  the   For all other analyses 
  
Dechow-Dichev (2002) 




        
  
2005 2006 2007 2005-07 
 
2005 2006 2007 2005-07 
Industry Sector N N N N   N N N N 
Agro and Food Industry Agribusiness 18 18 17 53 
 
18 18 18 54 
Agro and Food Industry Food and Beverage 21 21 21 63 
 
21 21 21 63 
Consumer Products Fashion 21 20 20 61 
 
21 21 20 62 
Consumer Products Home and Office Products 7 8 7 22 
 
7 8 7 22 
Consumer Products Personal Products and Pharmaceuticals 4 4 4 12 
 
4 4 4 12 
Industrials Automotive 10 10 10 30 
 
10 10 10 30 
Industrials Machinery and Equipment 1 - - 1 
 
1 - - 1 
Industrials Industrial Materials and Machinery - 11 11 22 
 
- 11 11 22 
Industrials Packaging 13 12 12 37 
 
13 12 12 37 
Industrials Paper and Printing Materials 3 3 2 8 
 
3 3 3 9 
Industrials Petrochemicals and Chemicals 11 9 9 29 
 
11 10 9 30 
Property and Construction Construction Materials 26 21 21 68 
 
26 21 21 68 
Property and Construction Property Development 37 38 37 112 
 
37 38 37 112 
Resources Energy and Utilities 14 14 13 41 
 
14 14 14 42 
Resources Mining 1 1 1 3 
 
1 1 1 3 
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Table 2 (continued) 
          
               For analyses using  the   For all other analyses 
  
Dechow-Dichev (2002)  




        
  
2005 2006 2007 2005-07 
 
2005 2006 2007 2005-07 
Industry Sector N N N N   N N N N 
Services Commerce 10 14 13 37 
 
10 14 13 37 
Services Health Care Services 13 13 13 39 
 
13 13 13 39 
Services Media and Publishing 16 24 22 62 
 
17 24 23 64 
Services Printing and Publishing 8 - - 8 
 
8 - - 8 
Services Professional Services 4 2 2 8 
 
4 2 2 8 
Services Tourism and Leisure 11 12 11 34 
 
11 13 11 35 
Services Transportation and Logistics 10 10 10 30 
 
10 10 10 30 
Technology Electrical Products and Computer 13 - - 13 
 
13 - - 13 
Technology Electronic Components 9 9 8 26 
 
9 9 9 27 
Technology Information and Communication Technology 16 19 19 54 
 
16 20 19 55 
           Total number of observations 297 293 283 873 
 
298 297 288 883 





Table 3  2005 initial sample composition and information on voting rights of controlling shareholders 
          Panel A: 2005 sample composition and summary statistics of voting rights            
       
% of voting rights 
  N %   N %   mean min max 
Total firms 
   
298 100.00 
    Firms with no controlling shareholder 
   
52 17.45 
    Firms with a controlling shareholder 
   
246 82.55 
 
49.58 25.07 90.83 
Composition by type of controlling shareholder: 
              Families/individuals 
   
188 63.09 
 
50.58 25.07 90.83 
          Founding families 169 89.89 
    
50.97 25.07 87.40 
         CEO is a family member 128 68.09 
    
51.31 25.07 90.83 
         Chairman is a family member 110 58.51 
    
51.98 25.07 87.40 
     Government 
   
17 5.70 
 
42.41 25.41 77.28 
     Widely-held corporations/financial institutions 
   
8 2.68 
 
38.89 25.30 63.40 
     Foreign investors 
   
33 11.07 
 




Table 3 (continued) 
         
          Panel B: Level of voting rights by type of controlling shareholder             
 








   N %   N %   N %   










 Widely-held corporations/financial 















                     
 77 
 
Table 4  Summary statistics of variables used in the study 
        Panel A: Summary statistics of variables used in accounting conservatism analysis  
(obs.=883)               
  Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th % 25th % 75th% 90th % 
Controlling shareholder and audit committee variables: 
   CS 0.824 1 0.381 0 1 1 1 
FAMILY 0.629 1 0.483 0 0 1 1 
WHLD 0.027 0 0.163 0 0 0 0 
GOVT 0.057 0 0.231 0 0 0 0 
FRGN 0.112 0 0.316 0 0 0 1 
VR25_50 0.442 0 0.497 0 0 1 1 
VR50_75 0.317 0 0.466 0 0 1 1 
VR75 0.066 0 0.248 0 0 0 0 
ACE 1.418 1 0.856 0 1 2 2 
        Financial variables: 
      NI 0.052 0.055 0.091 -0.044 0.013 0.099 0.147 
R 0.091 0.030 0.440 -0.377 -0.182 0.260 0.612 
NRD 0.458 0 0.498 0 0 1 1 
MTB 1.449 1.100 1.089 0.485 0.700 1.867 2.975 
LEV 0.260 0.256 0.200 0.000 0.077 0.415 0.533 
SIZE 8.094 7.848 1.321 6.555 7.125 8.888 9.937 
        Panel B: Summary statistics of variables used in analyses using the Dechow-Dichev  
(2002) model (obs.=873)             
  Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th % 25th % 75th% 90th % 
Controlling shareholder and audit committee effectiveness variables: 
  CS 0.825 1 0.380 0 1 1 1 
FAMILY 0.629 1 0.483 0 0 1 1 
WHLD 0.027 0 0.164 0 0 0 0 
GOVT 0.056 0 0.230 0 0 0 0 
FRGN 0.112 0 0.316 0 0 0 1 
VR25-50 0.442 0 0.497 0 0 1 1 
VR50-75 0.318 0 0.466 0 0 1 1 
VR• 75 0.064 0 0.245 0 0 0 0 
ACE 1.420 1 0.857 0 1 2 2 
 78 
 
Table 4 (continued) 
                Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th % 25th % 75th% 90th % 
Unsigned (absolute value) and signed abnormal accruals variables: 
  ABSAA_DD 0.041 0.030 0.041 0.006 0.013 0.055 0.088 
AA_DD 0.000 0.000 0.056 -0.063 -0.029 0.030 0.061 
        Financial variables: 
      MTB 1.443 1.084 1.084 0.483 0.698 1.866 2.974 
SGRWTH 0.102 0.073 0.328 -0.209 -0.036 0.181 0.373 
ROA 0.052 0.055 0.090 -0.043 0.013 0.099 0.147 
CFO 0.090 0.092 0.114 -0.048 0.028 0.153 0.231 
VOL 0.099 0.082 0.073 0.040 0.056 0.117 0.169 
LOPC 4.874 4.887 1.014 3.681 4.368 5.269 6.195 
LEV 0.260 0.255 0.200 0.000 0.076 0.414 0.533 
SIZE 8.085 7.836 1.320 6.545 7.102 8.877 9.933 
F_AGE 3.171 3.201 0.480 2.528 2.900 3.488 3.736 
        Panel C: Summary statistics of variables used in analyses using discretionary accruals  
models (in addition to those reported in Panel A) (obs.=883)     
  Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th % 25th % 75th% 90th % 
Absolute value of discretionary or abnormal accruals variables: 
  ABSAA_J1 0.065 0.047 0.062 0.008 0.022 0.086 0.148 
ABSAA_MJ1 0.067 0.047 0.067 0.008 0.022 0.085 0.155 
ABSAA_J2 0.060 0.045 0.055 0.008 0.019 0.080 0.136 
ABSAA_MJ2 0.059 0.045 0.055 0.008 0.020 0.079 0.135 
        Signed discretionary or abnormal accruals variables: 
   AA_J1 0.000 0.001 0.087 -0.093 -0.045 0.048 0.102 
AA_MJ1 0.000 -0.001 0.091 -0.090 -0.046 0.048 0.104 
AA_J2 -0.002 -0.003 0.078 -0.089 -0.049 0.043 0.097 
AA_MJ2 -0.002 -0.003 0.079 -0.089 -0.047 0.043 0.098 
        Financial variables: 
      SGRWTH 0.100 0.071 0.328 -0.209 -0.037 0.180 0.369 
ROA 0.052 0.055 0.091 -0.044 0.013 0.099 0.147 
CFO 0.091 0.092 0.114 -0.048 0.028 0.153 0.231 
VOL 0.099 0.083 0.073 0.040 0.056 0.118 0.169 
LOPC 4.871 4.878 1.015 3.681 4.351 5.268 6.195 
F_AGE 3.168 3.200 0.481 2.528 2.899 3.484 3.734 
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Table 5  Pearson/Spearman Correlation Matrix 
                Panel A: Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlations among variables used in accounting conservatism analysis   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) CS 
 
0.600 0.077 0.113 0.164 0.410 0.314 0.122 0.107 0.130 -0.042 0.017 0.108 -0.059 0.019 
(2) FAMILY 0.600 
 
-0.217 -0.319 -0.462 0.165 0.297 0.034 0.140 0.002 -0.066 0.080 0.070 -0.044 -0.161 
(3) WHLD 0.077 -0.217 
 
-0.041 -0.059 0.062 0.021 -0.044 -0.082 0.024 0.005 -0.028 0.037 -0.008 -0.034 
(4) GOVT 0.113 -0.319 -0.041 
 
-0.087 0.127 -0.041 -0.006 -0.040 0.130 0.042 -0.078 0.081 0.033 0.295 
(5) FRGN 0.164 -0.462 -0.059 -0.087 
 
0.118 -0.057 0.123 -0.014 0.046 0.017 -0.031 -0.055 -0.023 0.072 
(6) VR25_50 0.410 0.165 0.062 0.127 0.118 
 
-0.606 -0.236 0.051 0.048 -0.056 0.021 0.115 0.053 0.116 
(7) VR50_75 0.314 0.297 0.021 -0.041 -0.057 -0.606 
 
-0.181 0.000 0.046 0.005 0.009 -0.007 -0.082 -0.090 
(8) VR75 0.122 0.034 -0.044 -0.006 0.123 -0.236 -0.181 
 
0.063 0.018 0.039 -0.033 -0.051 -0.041 -0.033 
(9) ACE 0.109 0.136 -0.077 -0.031 -0.013 0.049 0.003 0.065 
 
0.065 -0.005 -0.058 0.029 0.041 0.181 
(10) NI 0.065 -0.065 0.018 0.164 0.049 0.029 0.022 0.000 0.064 
 
0.355 -0.394 0.312 -0.271 0.109 
(11) R -0.022 -0.072 0.010 0.048 0.044 -0.035 -0.003 0.041 0.047 0.499 
 
-0.692 -0.042 -0.039 0.008 
(12) NRD 0.017 0.080 -0.028 -0.078 -0.031 0.021 0.009 -0.033 -0.059 -0.464 -0.863 
 
-0.030 0.116 -0.043 
(13) MTB 0.096 0.019 0.014 0.113 -0.005 0.100 0.001 -0.057 0.053 0.460 0.029 -0.067 
 
0.021 0.233 
(14) LEV -0.065 -0.057 -0.010 0.046 -0.019 0.064 -0.092 -0.055 0.027 -0.318 -0.106 0.116 0.002 
 
0.306 






Table 5 (continued) 
                  
                    
Panel B: Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlations among variables used in analyses using the Dechow-Dichev (2002) accruals model     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) CS 
 
0.600 0.078 0.112 0.164 0.410 0.315 0.121 0.107 -0.082 0.107 -0.010 0.120 0.115 -0.105 -0.034 -0.053 0.024 0.056 
(2) FAMILY 0.600 
 
-0.219 -0.317 -0.463 0.168 0.296 0.027 0.142 -0.060 0.066 -0.064 -0.010 0.045 -0.008 -0.020 -0.036 -0.156 0.054 
(3) WHLD 0.078 -0.219 
 
-0.041 -0.060 0.062 0.020 -0.044 -0.083 0.009 0.039 0.038 0.024 -0.056 0.015 0.019 -0.008 -0.034 -0.056 
(4) GOVT 0.112 -0.317 -0.041 
 
-0.087 0.124 -0.039 -0.003 -0.038 -0.016 0.084 0.052 0.130 0.090 -0.050 -0.027 0.027 0.291 -0.063 
(5) FRGN 0.164 -0.463 -0.060 -0.087 
 
0.115 -0.056 0.129 -0.018 0.000 -0.053 0.029 0.053 0.034 -0.085 0.000 -0.025 0.072 0.060 
(6) VR25_50 0.410 0.168 0.062 0.124 0.115 
 
-0.609 -0.233 0.050 0.043 0.112 0.008 0.048 0.057 -0.044 0.013 0.051 0.112 -0.026 
(7) VR50_75 0.315 0.296 0.021 -0.039 -0.056 -0.609 
 
-0.179 -0.003 -0.111 -0.001 -0.007 0.045 0.046 -0.029 -0.027 -0.080 -0.086 0.040 
(8) VR75 0.121 0.027 -0.044 -0.003 0.129 -0.233 -0.179 
 
0.068 -0.004 -0.058 -0.019 0.001 -0.024 -0.020 -0.028 -0.032 -0.026 0.063 
(9) ACE 0.108 0.137 -0.078 -0.029 -0.017 0.048 0.000 0.070 
 
-0.055 0.037 -0.069 0.065 0.075 -0.117 -0.069 0.043 0.185 0.104 
(10) ABSAA_DD -0.033 -0.050 0.008 0.017 0.021 0.056 -0.098 0.021 -0.032 
 
0.027 0.043 -0.178 -0.029 0.201 0.212 0.002 -0.056 -0.087 
(11) MTB 0.096 0.018 0.016 0.113 -0.003 0.099 0.008 -0.067 0.058 -0.025 
 
0.125 0.316 0.287 -0.024 -0.216 0.025 0.234 -0.133 
(12) SGRWTH 0.002 -0.060 0.025 0.069 0.031 0.012 0.002 -0.026 -0.041 -0.032 0.172 
 
0.245 0.028 -0.008 -0.126 0.079 0.069 -0.071 
(13) ROA 0.058 -0.075 0.019 0.161 0.057 0.029 0.023 -0.013 0.067 -0.119 0.460 0.316 
 
0.551 -0.296 -0.233 -0.267 0.115 0.044 
(14) CFO 0.108 0.005 -0.039 0.114 0.059 0.059 0.044 -0.035 0.072 -0.057 0.300 0.062 0.567 
 
-0.203 -0.303 -0.241 0.055 0.050 
(15) VOL -0.084 0.002 0.033 -0.050 -0.086 -0.018 -0.012 -0.070 -0.112 0.167 -0.090 0.015 -0.258 -0.180 
 
0.141 0.219 -0.122 -0.130 
(16) LOPC -0.056 -0.011 0.006 -0.067 -0.004 -0.026 -0.003 -0.030 -0.087 0.266 -0.274 -0.220 -0.289 -0.306 0.169 
 
0.093 -0.040 -0.050 
(17) LEV -0.059 -0.049 -0.010 0.041 -0.021 0.062 -0.090 -0.047 0.030 0.009 0.001 0.097 -0.315 -0.251 0.246 0.106 
 
0.301 -0.125 
(18) SIZE 0.007 -0.149 -0.027 0.207 0.099 0.097 -0.091 -0.013 0.185 -0.032 0.248 0.132 0.095 0.026 -0.039 -0.034 0.330 
 
-0.096 




Table 5 (continued) 
                      
                       
Panel C: Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlations among variables used in analyses using discretionary accruals models                 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
(1) CS 
 
0.600 0.077 0.113 0.164 0.410 0.314 0.122 0.107 -0.084 -0.081 -0.060 -0.055 0.108 -0.011 0.129 0.118 -0.107 -0.032 -0.059 0.019 0.064 
(2) FAMILY 0.600 
 
-0.217 -0.319 -0.462 0.165 0.297 0.034 0.140 -0.066 -0.066 -0.041 -0.045 0.070 -0.067 0.001 0.046 -0.013 -0.017 -0.044 -0.161 0.061 
(3) WHLD 0.077 -0.217 
 
-0.041 -0.059 0.062 0.021 -0.044 -0.082 0.047 0.056 0.027 0.032 0.037 0.038 0.024 -0.056 0.015 0.019 -0.008 -0.034 -0.055 
(4) GOVT 0.113 -0.319 -0.041 
 
-0.087 0.127 -0.041 -0.006 -0.040 -0.047 -0.056 -0.055 -0.060 0.081 0.054 0.130 0.089 -0.051 -0.031 0.033 0.295 -0.064 
(5) FRGN 0.164 -0.462 -0.059 -0.087 
 
0.118 -0.057 0.123 -0.014 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.030 -0.055 0.030 0.046 0.036 -0.080 -0.000 -0.023 0.072 0.060 
(6) VR25_50 0.410 0.165 0.062 0.127 0.118 
 
-0.606 -0.236 0.051 0.026 0.036 0.026 0.031 0.115 0.007 0.048 0.057 -0.041 0.017 0.053 0.116 -0.023 
(7) VR50_75 0.314 0.297 0.021 -0.041 -0.057 -0.606 
 
-0.181 0.000 -0.099 -0.107 -0.075 -0.078 -0.007 -0.004 0.045 0.043 -0.031 -0.027 -0.082 -0.090 0.042 
(8) VR75 0.122 0.034 -0.044 -0.006 0.123 -0.236 -0.181 
 
0.063 0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.051 -0.023 0.017 -0.012 -0.026 -0.032 -0.041 -0.033 0.066 
(9) ACE 0.109 0.136 -0.077 -0.031 -0.013 0.049 0.003 0.065 
 
-0.026 -0.026 -0.032 -0.014 0.029 -0.070 0.064 0.072 -0.114 -0.062 0.041 0.181 0.105 
(10) ABSAA_J1 -0.068 -0.078 0.060 -0.023 0.024 0.022 -0.090 0.022 -0.033 
 
0.978 0.847 0.781 0.072 -0.004 -0.226 -0.145 0.174 0.177 0.042 -0.016 -0.123 
(11) ABSAA_MJ1 -0.070 -0.074 0.061 -0.039 0.025 0.020 -0.092 0.025 -0.030 0.967 
 
0.830 0.776 0.060 -0.013 -0.240 -0.144 0.183 0.186 0.047 -0.010 -0.117 
(12) ABSAA_J2 -0.049 -0.043 0.012 -0.039 0.029 0.024 -0.069 0.007 -0.026 0.774 0.750 
 
0.934 0.075 0.044 -0.095 -0.082 0.112 0.170 0.017 -0.019 -0.170 
(13) ABSAAA_MJ2 -0.046 -0.050 -0.001 -0.040 0.051 0.023 -0.073 0.021 0.009 0.700 0.696 0.894 
 
0.084 0.039 -0.081 -0.090 0.104 0.164 0.009 -0.004 -0.151 
(14) MTB 0.096 0.019 0.014 0.113 -0.005 0.100 0.001 -0.057 0.053 0.013 0.007 0.024 0.046 
 
0.120 0.315 0.291 -0.026 -0.214 0.021 0.233 -0.132 
(15) SGRWTH 0.003 -0.062 0.026 0.074 0.031 0.014 0.006 -0.034 -0.042 -0.036 -0.053 0.006 0.007 0.166 
 
0.239 0.028 -0.009 -0.130 0.080 0.066 -0.069 
(16) ROA 0.065 -0.065 0.018 0.164 0.049 0.029 0.022 0.000 0.064 -0.106 -0.119 -0.072 -0.061 0.460 0.311 
 
0.548 -0.299 -0.224 -0.273 0.108 0.056 
(17) CFO 0.112 0.006 -0.039 0.114 0.062 0.059 0.040 -0.023 0.068 -0.142 -0.156 -0.076 -0.079 0.303 0.061 0.565 
 
-0.203 -0.305 -0.243 0.053 0.050 
(18) VOL -0.089 -0.005 0.033 -0.049 -0.080 -0.013 -0.016 -0.079 -0.108 0.163 0.169 0.119 0.104 -0.089 0.012 -0.264 -0.182 
 
0.142 0.221 -0.118 -0.132 
(19) LOPC -0.054 -0.007 0.006 -0.071 -0.005 -0.023 -0.002 -0.033 -0.079 0.189 0.203 0.195 0.180 -0.274 -0.217 -0.284 -0.308 0.168 
 
0.091 -0.038 -0.045 
(20) LEV -0.065 -0.057 -0.010 0.046 -0.019 0.064 -0.092 -0.055 0.027 0.055 0.046 0.037 0.019 0.002 0.098 -0.318 -0.252 0.250 0.102 
 
0.306 -0.131 
(21) SIZE 0.002 -0.155 -0.028 0.211 0.099 0.101 -0.095 -0.021 0.181 0.016 0.023 0.003 0.021 0.250 0.129 0.091 0.024 -0.031 -0.036 0.335 
 
-0.102 
(22) F_AGE 0.054 0.052 -0.060 -0.027 0.036 -0.033 0.045 0.064 0.112 -0.148 -0.139 -0.185 -0.153 -0.176 -0.079 0.001 0.029 -0.172 -0.018 -0.165 -0.132 
                                               
Bold text indicates significance at 5% level or better (two-tailed). 




Table 6  Comtemporaneous association between earnings and returns 
    NI = β0+β1NRD+β2R+β3R*NRD+ε 
                   
  β0 β1 β2 β3 Adj. R2 N 
Panel A: Full sample (2005-2007) 
     
 
0.082*** -0.022*** 0.006 0.195*** 0.221 883 
 
(13.82) (-2.69) (0.38) (5.23) 
  
         β0 β1 β2 β3 Adj. R2 N 
Panel B: Subsample by sign of returns 
     


















                 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed). 
Standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are used to compute t-statistics. 
 All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 7  Comparison of the degree of accounting conservatism between groups 
      Model: NI = • 0+• 1NRD+• 2R+• 3R*NRD+• 
        
           Panel A: By characteristics of controlling shareholders             
Firms with a 
   
Firms    
 
Comparison   
























           family/individual 
 
















widely held corp./fin insti. 
 







































































Table 7 (continued) 
          
           Firms with a       Firms      Comparison       














        N • 3   N • 3   Diff. in • 3 
           50%<VR<75% 
 


































           Panel B: By the degree of audit committee effectiveness             
    
> median 
 
•  median 
  






Audit committee effectiveness variable   N • 3   N • 3   Diff. in • 3 







                      




Table 8  The associations of controlling shareholders and audit committee 
effectiveness with accounting conservatism 
         Panel A: Full sample (2005-2007)             





variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 





CS -0.019 -1.34 
    
-0.015 -1.08 
ACE 



















NRD*CS 0.009 0.41 
    
0.006 0.25 
NRD*ACE 
























R*CS 0.051 1.37 
    
0.044 1.26 
R*ACE 
























R*NRD*CS -0.206 -2.06** 
    
-0.194 -2.06** 
R*NRD*ACE 




































Table 8 (continued) 
       
         Panel B: Subsample (2006-2007)             





variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 





CS -0.002 -0.11 
    
0.002 0.14 
ACE 



















NRD*CS -0.010 -0.46 
    
-0.016 -0.71 
NRD*ACE 
























R*CS 0.009 0.24 
    
0.001 0.03 
R*ACE 
























R*NRD*CS -0.207 -2.43** 
    
-0.205 -2.47** 
R*NRD*ACE 


































                  
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-
tailed). 
Standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are used to compute t-statistics. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 9 The associations of controlling shareholders and audit committee 
effectiveness with accounting conservatism (by type of controlling shareholders and 
level of voting rights) 
              
Panel A: Full sample (2005-2007)         
By type of controlling shareholders 
 
By level of voting rights 
Independent variable Coef. t   Independent variable Coef. t 
NRD -0.062 -1.27 
  
-0.040 -0.86 
FAMILY -0.016 -1.06 
 
VR25_50 -0.019 -1.36 
WHLD -0.022 -1.19 
 
VR50_75 -0.016 -1.07 
GOVT 0.004 0.27 
 
VR75 0.004 0.19 
FRGN -0.028 -1.76* 
    ACE -0.008 -1.77* 
  
-0.010 -2.40** 
MTB 0.028 5.07*** 
  
0.029 5.41*** 
LEV -0.097 -3.68*** 
  
-0.105 -3.99*** 
SIZE 0.001 0.25 
  
0.004 1.17 
NRD*FAMILY 0.001 0.05 
 
NRD*VR25_50 0.019 0.84 
NRD*WHLD 0.020 0.61 
 
NRD*VR50_75 -0.005 -0.21 
NRD*GOVT 0.017 0.55 
 
NRD*VR75 -0.021 -0.64 
NRD*FRGN 0.041 1.42 
    NRD*ACE 0.006 0.72 
  
0.006 0.78 
NRD*MTB 0.009 0.88 
  
0.006 0.67 
NRD*LEV -0.046 -1.13 
  
-0.049 -1.19 
NRD*SIZE 0.005 0.87 
  
0.003 0.53 
R -0.024 -0.38 
  
-0.009 -0.15 
R*FAMILY 0.039 1.09 
 
R*VR25_50 0.057 1.69* 
R*WHLD 0.027 0.72 
 
R*VR50_75 0.053 1.60 
R*GOVT 0.055 1.57 
 
R*VR75 -0.018 -0.35 
R*FRGN 0.097 2.08** 
    R*ACE 0.031 2.77*** 
  
0.036 3.80*** 
R*MTB 0.020 1.55 
  
0.015 1.31 
R*LEV -0.078 -1.14 
  
-0.059 -0.89 






Table 9 (continued) 
     
       By type of controlling shareholders   By level of voting rights 
Independent 
variable Coef. t   
Independent 
variable Coef. t 
R*NRD 0.271 1.20 
  
0.289 1.29 
R*NRD*FAMILY -0.188 -1.98** 
 
R*NRD*VR25_50 -0.175 -1.85* 
R*NRD*WHLD -0.162 -1.71* 
 
R*NRD*VR50_75 -0.242 -2.41** 
R*NRD*GOVT -0.297 -2.62*** 
 
R*NRD*VR75 -0.172 -1.42 
R*NRD*FRGN -0.160 -1.31 
    R*NRD*ACE -0.057 -1.53 
  
-0.059 -1.62 
R*NRD*MTB 0.037 1.13 
  
0.040 1.23 
R*NRD*LEV -0.161 -0.98 
  
-0.175 -1.04 
R*NRD*SIZE 0.013 0.57 
  
0.011 0.50 
Intercept 0.067 2.04** 
  
0.044 1.42 






       Panel B: Subsample (2006-2007)         
By type of controlling shareholders 
 
By level of voting rights 
Independent 
variable Coef. t   
Independent 
variable Coef. t 
NRD -0.057 -0.95 
  
-0.039 -0.69 
FAMILY 0.003 0.17 
 
VR25_50 -0.006 -0.38 
WHLD -0.011 -0.44 
 
VR50_75 -0.002 -0.09 
GOVT 0.019 1.11 
 
VR75 0.034 1.34 
FRGN -0.015 -0.84 
    ACE -0.007 -1.29 
  
-0.009 -1.85* 
MTB 0.034 4.65*** 
  
0.034 5.05*** 
LEV -0.100 -3.25*** 
  
-0.117 -3.60*** 
SIZE -0.000 -0.09 
  
0.004 0.78 
NRD*FAMILY -0.019 -0.78 
 
NRD*VR25_50 0.003 0.13 
NRD*WHLD 0.019 0.48 
 
NRD*VR50_75 -0.019 -0.70 
NRD*GOVT -0.014 -0.37 
 
NRD*VR75 -0.035 -1.07 
NRD*FRGN 0.028 0.90 





Table 9 (continued) 
     
       By type of controlling shareholders   By level of voting rights 
Independent 
variable Coef. t   
Independent 
variable Coef. t 
NRD*MTB -0.000 -0.03 
  
-0.001 -0.08 
NRD*LEV -0.085 -1.76* 
  
-0.072 -1.45 
NRD*SIZE 0.008 1.06 
  
0.005 0.70 
R -0.017 -0.21 
  
0.011 0.14 
R*FAMILY -0.005 -0.12 
 
R*VR25_50 0.023 0.75 
R*WHLD 0.000 0.01 
 
R*VR50_75 0.019 0.61 
R*GOVT 0.009 0.27 
 
R*VR75 -0.076 -1.37 
R*FRGN 0.052 1.33 
    R*ACE 0.028 2.34** 
  
0.034 3.25*** 
R*MTB 0.009 0.47 
  
0.007 0.42 
R*LEV -0.088 -1.10 
  
-0.038 -0.46 
R*SIZE 0.004 0.39 
  
-0.003 -0.29 
R*NRD 0.446 2.15** 
  
0.402 1.99** 
R*NRD*FAMILY -0.188 -2.25** 
 
R*NRD*VR25_50 -0.190 -2.24** 
R*NRD*WHLD -0.175 -1.80* 
 
R*NRD*VR50_75 -0.260 -2.68*** 
R*NRD*GOVT -0.379 -3.20*** 
 
R*NRD*VR75 0.212 0.79 
R*NRD*FRGN -0.092 -0.61 
    R*NRD*ACE -0.022 -0.53 
  
-0.019 -0.45 
R*NRD*MTB 0.075 2.30** 
  
0.080 2.61** 
R*NRD*LEV -0.323 -1.72* 
  
-0.316 -1.62 
R*NRD*SIZE -0.009 -0.34 
  
-0.005 -0.19 
Intercept 0.051 1.16 
  
0.025 0.59 






              
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-
tailed). 
Standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are used to compute t-statistics. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level
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Table 10  The impact of controlling shareholders on the association between audit committee effectiveness and accounting 
conservatism 
              Full sample (2005-2007)   Subsample (2006-2007) 
 
Firms with no CS 
 
Firms with a CS 
 
Firms with no CS 
 
Firms with a CS 
Independent Regression (1) 
 
Regression (2)   Regression (3)   Regression (4) 
variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 





































































































Table 10 (continued) 
          
              Full sample (2005-2007)   Subsample (2006-2007) 
 
Firms with no CS 
 
Firms with a CS 
 
Firms with no CS 
 
Firms with a CS 
Independent Regression (1) 
 
Regression (2)   Regression (3)   Regression (4) 
variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 
























































                        
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed). 
  Standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are used to compute t-statistics. 
   All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 11  The associations of controlling shareholders and audit committee effectiveness with accruals-based earnings 
quality 












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 


















































































































































Table 11 (continued) 
             












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 
















































































































































                              
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed). Standard errors adjusted for firm-
level clustering are used to compute t-statistics. ABSAA_DD, ABSAA_J1, ABSAA_MJ1, ABSAA_J2, and ABSAA_MJ2 are 
winsorized at 99% level. All other continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 12  The associations of types of controlling shareholders and audit committee effectiveness with accruals-based 
earnings quality 
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Table 12 (continued) 
 












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 
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Table 12 (continued) 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed). Standard errors adjusted for firm-
level              clustering are used to compute t-statistics. ABSAA_DD, ABSAA_J1, ABSAA_MJ1, ABSAA_J2, and ABSAA_MJ2 are 
winsorized at 99%  
level. All other continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 13 The associations of levels of voting rights of controlling shareholders and audit committee effectiveness with accruals-
based earnings quality 












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 




































































































































































***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed).  Standard errors adjusted for firm-level 
clustering are used to compute t-statistics.  ABSAA_DD, ABSAA_J1, ABSAA_MJ1, ABSAA_J2, and ABSAA_MJ2 are winsorized at 
99% level.  All other continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
 
 
Table 13 (continued) 
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Table 14  The associations of types of controlling shareholders and audit committee effectiveness with signed abnormal 
accruals 












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 
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Table 14 (continued) 
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Table 14 (continued) 












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 














































































































































































***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed).  Standard errors adjusted for firm-level 
clustering are used to compute t-statistics.  All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
 
 
Table 14 (continued) 
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Table 15  The relation between audit committee effectiveness and accruals-based earnings quality 
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Table 15 (continued) 
             












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 







































































































































                              
       ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed).  Standard errors adjusted for  
       firm-level clustering are used to compute t-statistics.ABSAA_DD, ABSAA_J1, ABSAA_MJ1, ABSAA_J2, and ABSAA_MJ2  




Table 16  The relation between audit committee effectiveness and accruals-based earnings quality - by whether firms have a 
controlling shareholder 
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Table 16 (continued) 
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Table 16 (continued) 
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Table 16 (continued) 
             












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 







































































































































                              
              ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed).  Standard errors adjusted  
              for firm-level clustering are used to compute t-statistics.  ABSAA_DD, ABSAA_J1, ABSAA_MJ1, ABSAA_J2, and  
              ABSAA_MJ2 are winsorized at 99% level. All other continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level.
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Table 17  Summary statistics and correlation matrix for performance analysis 
        
Panel A: Summary statistics of variables used in firm performance analysis   
  Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th % 25th % 75th% 90th % 
ROA(EBITDA) 0.132 0.125 0.110 0.018 0.072 0.185 0.269 
Tobin's q 1.198 1.007 0.633 0.644 0.814 1.384 1.992 
 
 
       
Panel B: Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlations among variables used in performance analysis         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) CS 
 
0.600 0.077 0.113 0.164 0.410 0.314 0.122 0.129 0.144 0.057 -0.011 -0.107 -0.059 0.019 0.064 
(2) FAMILY 0.600 
 
-0.217 -0.319 -0.462 0.165 0.297 0.034 0.001 0.024 0.005 -0.067 -0.013 -0.044 -0.161 0.061 
(3) WHLD 0.077 -0.217 
 
-0.041 -0.059 0.062 0.021 -0.044 0.024 0.020 0.062 0.039 0.015 -0.008 -0.034 -0.055 
(4) GOVT 0.113 -0.319 -0.041 
 
-0.087 0.127 -0.041 -0.006 0.130 0.132 0.072 0.054 -0.051 0.033 0.295 -0.064 
(5) FRGN 0.164 -0.462 -0.059 -0.087 
 
0.118 -0.057 0.123 0.046 0.031 -0.023 0.030 -0.080 -0.023 0.072 0.060 
(6) VR25_50 0.410 0.165 0.062 0.127 0.118 
 
-0.606 -0.236 0.048 0.067 0.045 0.007 -0.041 0.053 0.116 -0.023 
(7) VR50_75 0.314 0.297 0.021 -0.041 -0.057 -0.606 
 
-0.181 0.045 0.049 -0.013 -0.004 -0.031 -0.083 -0.090 0.042 
(8) VR75 0.122 0.034 -0.044 -0.006 0.123 -0.236 -0.181 
 
0.017 -0.003 0.021 -0.023 -0.026 -0.041 -0.033 0.066 
(9) ROA 0.065 -0.065 0.018 0.164 0.049 0.029 0.022 0.000 
 
0.917 0.409 0.239 -0.299 -0.273 0.108 0.056 
(10) ROA(EBITDA) 0.097 -0.026 0.008 0.142 0.048 0.063 0.021 -0.016 0.920 
 
0.498 0.234 -0.259 -0.212 0.113 0.027 
(11) Tobin's q 0.039 -0.035 0.018 0.118 0.005 0.061 -0.025 -0.017 0.512 0.535 
 
0.072 0.083 -0.057 0.168 -0.082 
(12) SGRWTH 0.003 -0.062 0.026 0.074 0.031 0.014 0.006 -0.034 0.311 0.325 0.207 
 
-0.009 0.080 0.066 -0.069 
(13) VOL -0.089 -0.005 0.033 -0.049 -0.080 -0.013 -0.016 -0.079 -0.264 -0.250 -0.038 0.012 
 
0.221 -0.118 -0.132 
(14) LEV -0.065 -0.057 -0.010 0.046 -0.019 0.064 -0.092 -0.055 -0.318 -0.221 0.017 0.098 0.250 
 
0.306 -0.131 
(15) SIZE 0.002 -0.155 -0.028 0.211 0.099 0.101 -0.095 -0.021 0.091 0.081 0.230 0.129 -0.031 0.335 
 
-0.102 
(16) F_AGE 0.054 0.052 -0.060 -0.027 0.036 -0.033 0.045 0.064 0.001 -0.009 -0.133 -0.079 -0.172 -0.165 -0.132 
                                   
Bold text indicates significance at 5% or better (two-tailed). 
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Table 18  Controlling shareholders and firm performance 








Variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 
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***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-
tailed). 
Standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are used to compute t-statistics. 




Table 19  The associations of ownership concentration and audit committee 
effectiveness with accounting conservatism 
       Top 3 Shareholders   Top 5 Shareholders 
Independent Regression (1) 
 
Independent Regression (2) 
variable Coef. t   variable Coef. t 
NRD -0.040 -0.82 
  
-0.031 -0.57 
TOP3 -0.050 -1.89* 
 
TOP5 -0.054 -1.91* 
ACE -0.007 -1.70* 
  
-0.006 -1.56 
MTB 0.028 5.23*** 
  
0.028 5.28*** 
LEV -0.098 -3.70*** 
  
-0.097 -3.64*** 
SIZE 0.003 0.78 
  
0.003 0.64 
NRD*TOP3 -0.009 -0.19 
 
NRD*TOP5 -0.022 -0.43 
NRD*ACE 0.001 0.08 
  
0.000 0.02 
NRD*MTB 0.010 1.00 
  
0.009 0.96 
NRD*LEV -0.053 -1.28 
  
-0.056 -1.35 
NRD*SIZE 0.005 0.81 
  
0.005 0.83 
R -0.070 -1.11 
  
-0.100 -1.52 
R*TOP3 0.144 2.11** 
 
R*TOP5 0.163 2.31** 
R*ACE 0.028 2.40** 
  
0.025 2.32** 
R*MTB 0.020 1.64 
  
0.018 1.56 
R*LEV -0.088 -1.35 
  
-0.092 -1.41 
R*SIZE -0.000 -0.01 
  
0.001 0.18 
R*NRD 0.369 1.48 
  
0.479 1.80* 
R*NRD*TOP3 -0.477 -2.37** 
 
R*NRD*TOP5 -0.559 -2.68*** 
R*NRD*ACE -0.070 -1.63 
  
-0.066 -1.59 
R*NRD*MTB 0.040 1.21 
  
0.040 1.21 
R*NRD*LEV -0.150 -0.97 
  
-0.147 -0.97 
R*NRD*SIZE 0.011 0.46 
  
0.007 0.31 
Intercept 0.063 2.12** 
  
0.072 2.26** 






              
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-
tailed). 
Standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are used to compute t-statistics. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 20  The associations of ownership concentration and audit committee characteristics with accruals-based earnings 
quality 












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 




















































































































































***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed).  Standard errors adjusted for firm-level 
clustering are used to compute t-statistics.  ABSAA_DD, ABSAA_J1, ABSAA_MJ1, ABSAA_J2, and ABSAA_MJ2 are winsorized at 
99% level.  All other continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
 
Table 20 (continued) 
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Table 21  The associations of ownership concentration and audit committee effectiveness with signed abnormal accruals 












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 




















































































































































Table 21 (continued) 
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Table 21 (continued) 
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Table 21 (continued) 
             












variable Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t   Coef. t 
















































































































































                              
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed). 
Standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are used to compute t-statistics. 
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